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ABSTRACT 
Wilkinson, Brett David. A validation study of the orientation model. Published Doctor of  
Philosophy dissertation, University of Northern Colorado, 2016. 
 
 The orientation model is a multidimensional measure of dual-processing 
capacities that incorporates four empirically-validated instruments taken from the 
existing literature on cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and self-focused 
attention. As a strength-based conceptualization tool for humanistic counseling practices, 
the model is intended to provide counselors with a flexible means to assess non-
diagnostic client attributes within a dispositional model of client cognitive processing 
patterns. Although humanistic principles often conflict with the use of quantitative 
instruments in clinical practice, the model is guided by the tenet that objective measures 
can effectively supplement clinical insight into client patterns of functioning. It thus 
serves as a means by which to bridge the gap between objective testing and the 
philosophical tenets upheld by humanistic counselors. 
 As such, this survey-based study examined the habitual use of dual-process 
tendencies using four established, non-clinical, and empirically-validated instruments: the 
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), the  
Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the 
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Interpersonal Reactivity In dex (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the Reflection-Rumination 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The coherence of the orientation 
model rests on the presupposition that each of the subscales within the four instruments 
correspond with distinct dual-processing styles. The current study was designed to 
explore this possibility in order to validate the conceptual underpinnings of the 
orientation model itself. 
 Self-report responses from 375 college students were used to determine whether 
relationships grounded in dual-processing capacities exist among the disparate model 
variables. Canonical correlation and multivariate analysis of variance results suggest that 
the orientation model provides a descriptive framework for distinguishing self-perceived 
adaptiveness or perceptiveness from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity rather than 
providing an explanatory foundation linked to dual process theories. This interpretation is 
examined in relation to the dual-processing literature, and directions for future research 
and theory generation are suggested. Practical implications are discussed in terms of 
applying the model as a case conceptualization tool in clinical and supervisory settings, 
concerns related to potential misinterpretations of a thinking/feeling dichotomy in clinical 
practice, and the therapeutic value of the instruments outside a dual-process framework.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 The assessments typically taught in counselor education courses and used by 
counselors in the field span five primary areas of clinical interest (Neukrug, Peterson, 
Bonner, & Lomas, 2013): diagnosis and psychopathology, symptom severity, problem 
behaviors, intelligence, and personality-based career compatibility. Valuable as these 
categories are in terms of illuminating general trait and behavioral tendencies among 
clients, they provide little relevant information regarding subtler client processes of 
interpretation, internalization, and interaction (Wilkinson, 2015). Clinical assessments of 
problem behaviors, symptom severity, and diagnostic criteria tend to emphasize client 
limitations rather than strengths (Elkins, 2007). Furthermore, the usefulness of 
personality testing has arguably limited practical usefulness for counselors (Epstein, 
2010), while intelligence measures are primary of use with relatively narrow and specific 
populations (Seligman, 1996). 
 This study was designed to validate the conceptual tenets of the orientation model 
as a strength-based conceptualization framework for humanistic counselors (Wilkinson, 
2015). The model is a versatile assessment tool designed to provide counselors with a 
means to recognize and address important client attributes within a humanistic and 
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existential framework (Wilkinson, 2015). In this respect, it asserts that insight into the 
dispositional tendencies of clients can provide counselors with relevant information on 
how clients interpret their experiences in and of the world. Constructs related to cognitive 
processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection are assessed using already established 
and well-validated measures developed by psychologists to ascertain within-individual 
differences. Each of the four measures were originally constructed using confirmatory 
factor analysis to test theoretically-grounded hypotheses. As such, the orientation model 
benefits from being a psychological model “situated within a coherent, intraindividual 
theoretical framework” (J. Block, 2010, p. 5) that lends itself to applied counseling 
practices. 
 As a supplement to counseling practice, the orientation model provides a flexible 
means by which to ascertain how dispositional variations in cognitive and emotional 
processing influence client experiences in the world. The model proposes that unique, 
client-specific processing patterns result in distinctive presenting styles and behavioral 
consequences. Furthermore, it suggests that each of the measures of cognitive processing, 
attachment, empathy, and introspection used in the model actually gauge dispositional 
variations that align with the tenets of dual-process theories. Dual-process theories 
provide the overarching theoretical framework for the orientation model and suggest that 
two distinctive yet highly interactive cognitive processing systems - analytic and 
experiential - operate within the human experience. The orientation model asserts that by 
harnessing measures that distinguish between the preferential, habitual use of these dual-
processing tendencies, counselors can effectively supplement their clinical observations 
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and judgments with valuable assessment data that informs case conceptualization 
practices and augments treatment planning. 
Dual Process Theories 
 The general tenets of dual-process theory provide the theoretical foundation for 
the orientation model, serving as the conceptual glue that binds the different constructs 
and measures into a cohesive whole. Supportive evidence in both developmental (Reyna 
& Rivers, 2008) and affective (Panksepp, 2003) neuroscience lends heightened credibility 
to the burgeoning experimental and theoretical work conducted on dual-process concepts 
in social and cognitive psychology (Epstein, 2014; Evans, 2010). In terms of evolutionary 
biology, the more recently developed analytic system involves the controlled and rational 
processing capacities of the neocortex, as contrasted with the more primitive, automatic, 
and affect-oriented experiential processing of the limbic system (Epstein, 2014; Evans, 
2010; Panksepp, 1998). Each system is therefore related to unique processing capacities. 
Analytic-rational cognitive processes are logical, intentional, explicit, conscious, 
linguistic, and slow whereas experiential-intuitive cognitive processes are associative, 
automatic, implicit, preconscious, symbolic, and fast (Stanovich, West, & Toplak, 2014). 
 Despite their unique capacities, however, the analytic and experiential systems are 
highly integrated. In fact, such dichotomous divisions belie the level of integration 
necessary for cognition to be evolutionarily adaptive, as explicit cognitive representations 
of the world rely upon primary experiences such as implicit attitudes and feelings in order 
to ground a cognitive simulation (Stanovich et al., 2014). Similar conjectures about the 
integrative nature of dual-processing systems is found in philosophy of mind, as the inter-
dependence of access and phenomenal consciousness parallel discussions held among 
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dual-process theorists (Chalmers, 1996; N. Block, 1995). The implications of a lack of 
integration is similarly discussed across both fields, with concerns levied in regards to 
how the lack of “theory of mind” among individuals on the autism spectrum might be a 
consequence of uncontrolled analytic and experiential decoupling (Chalmers, 1996; 
Hwang, Evans, & Mackenzie, 2007; Stanovich et al., 2014). 
 Yet the distinction between the two systems remains leverageable for the 
purposes of counseling precisely due to the integrative nature of analytic and experiential 
processes (Epstein, 2014). From Plato (380 BC/1974) to William James (1890/1950), the 
duality of thinking and feeling has historically served to illuminate the remarkable 
dispositional differences we observe among individuals. Viewed on a continuum, 
habitual tendencies towards either rational or emotional processing manifest in distinctive 
ways that counselors can easily recognize from clinical experience. It is this thinking-
feeling dichotomy that many counselors utilize to design individual treatment approaches 
that fit the unique needs of particular clients (Epstein, 2014). So while the complexities of 
dual-processes are granted due respect in the orientation model, the thinking-feeling 
dichotomy remains a viable and pragmatic way to connect counselor observations with 
assessment methods to inform clinical judgments, case conceptualizations, and treatment 
decisions (Wilkinson, 2015). 
 By focusing on broader dispositional trends rather than specific or narrow traits 
and behaviors, the orientation model eschews simplistic labels in favor of rich and 
dynamic descriptions of intrapersonal experience. In combination, the four constructs of 
cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection lend insight into how 
clients uniquely experience and manifest the thinking-feeling dichotomy in their own 
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lifeworld (Wilkinson, 2015). Individual variations across these dual-processing 
tendencies, stemming from the habitual use of particular coping strategies (Evans, 2010), 
are a consequence of the reinforcement and activation of either analytic or experiential 
processes under conditions of stress (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). In accord with humanistic 
principles, the model thus provides a holistic perspective on how clients subjectively 
interpret experiences through the lens of habitual cognitive patterns, and it actively 
avoids the use of symptom or diagnosis-based language (Greenberg, Elliot, & Lietaer, 
2003). Counselors can utilize such an assessment-derived analysis of client patterns to 
choose treatments that capitalize on individual strengths within a descriptive framework 
without resorting to narrow categorizations or labels. 
Design of the Orientation Model 
 For each of the four constructs and corresponding measures, two subscales are 
used to distinguish between analytic and experiential tendencies. These relate to rational 
and intuitive cognition styles, emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity attachment 
styles, cognitive and emotional empathy styles, and reflective and ruminative 
introspection styles (Wilkinson, 2015). The only measure used in the orientation model 
that was designed based upon a dual-process theory framework is the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996), used to distinguish between rational 
and intuitive styles of cognition. The other three measures were developed independently 
of dual process theorizing, and so the orientation model presupposes that each of their 
sub-measures correspond with distinct dual-processing styles. The current study was 
therefore designed to explore this hypothesis in order to validate the conceptual 
underpinnings of the orientation model itself. 
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 The therapeutic value of relating these constructs to dual-processing tendencies 
arises from the way in which their distinctive combinations can be used as a lens through 
which to understand client interpretations of experience. In this manner, each construct 
represents a continuum of growth-potential that also sheds light on the motivational 
factors underlying the presenting concerns and related behaviors of clients (Cervone, 
2005). For a client that presents with a history of depression and unsatisfactory 
relationships, for example, the course of treatment is going to vary depending on a 
multitude of dynamic factors. This is a typical scenario in which the counselor has a 
vague understanding of client presenting concerns and history, and proceeds with the 
intention of discovering important details about the client in order to develop an 
appropriate treatment plan. However, the initial course of treatment will look 
significantly different if the counselor knows this client experiences high levels of 
cognitive processing with moderate to low levels of experiential processing, high levels 
of emotional cutoff, relatively low levels of cognitive empathy, moderate to high levels 
of emotional empathy, and rumination tendencies. Each of these scores provide important 
descriptive information regarding how this client interprets their life experience, relates to 
others, and copes when under stress.  
 This client is likely to be a highly analytical ruminator with a limited ability to 
grasp the viewpoints of others and a history of cutoff relationships, but a relatively high 
degree of sensitivity to, and empathic felt-sense of, compassionate awareness. Put another 
way, this client operates within a distinctive lifeworld experience: from a rational 
viewpoint, avoidant of emotional conflict, limited in their cognitive perspective-taking 
yet sensitive to emotional cues, and liable to chronically introspect on negative past 
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experiences. The primary benefit of this assessment is twofold: it highlights the strengths 
of this client and it lends the information immediately to the counselor. Our hypothetical 
client’s rationality and emotional empathy in particular are primed for clinical use, and 
also serves as additional fodder for the building of counselor empathy towards the client. 
It further allows the counselor to develop a rich conceptualization early in the therapeutic 
process, thus lending itself to an intentional verification process rather than an arbitrarily 
exploratory one.  
 At the same time, the orientation model does not presuppose that a particular 
course of treatment should derive from the information highlighted in the assessment. 
The model itself is fundamentally atheoretical, serving as a means to clarify the 
dispositional tendencies of clients by highlighting important factors that contextualize 
presenting concerns and behaviors. As a functional apparatus for case conceptualization 
purposes, it maintains that treatment should proceed according to the clinical judgment 
and expertise of the counselor. So while the model is designed within a humanistic-
existential framework, it is important to recognize that the assessment can be used across 
any and all theoretical orientations.  
 However, the model does provide a conceptually coherent framework for 
humanistic and existential counselors who may be otherwise disinclined to utilize 
assessments as a therapeutic tool. Since the accurate identification of dispositional styles 
is arguably a key component of clinical decision-making across theoretical orientations 
(Wilkinson, 2015), the use of assessments to augment the selection of therapeutic 
strategies, techniques, and interventions does not depart significantly from the standard 
process of making clinical judgments. In this respect, the orientation model can be 
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designated as an atheoretical, strengths-based conceptualization tool designed within an 
existential-humanistic conceptual framework (Wilkinson, 2015). Whether used as a 
supplement for situation-specific clinical judgments or as a template for building 
humanistic case conceptualizations, it grants counselors an opportunity to gain insight 
into important features of client experience and style of interpretation. By means of its 
validation in this study, a new and valuable tool for counselors in practice may become 
accessible. 
Problem Statement 
 Dual-process theories have been predominantly used as a theoretical basis for 
exploring phenomena such as implicit memory (Smith & DeCoster, 2000), decision 
making (Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002), deductive reasoning (Evans & 
Over, 1996), and implicit learning (Reber, 1993; Sun, Slusarz, & Terry, 2005) in 
cognitive psychology, as well as social judgment (Bargh, 2006, Wilson, 2002), persuasion 
(Chaiken, 1987; Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986), stereotypes (Devine, 1989; 
Duckitt, Wagner, Du Plessis, & Birum, 2002), and implicit attitudes (Gawronski & 
Bodenhausen, 2006; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000) in social psychology. Attempts 
to directly apply dual-process theories in a therapeutic context have been either within 
complex, global personality assessment frameworks that require counselors to adopt the 
entire conceptual system (Epstein, 2014), or in relation to highly specific topics such as 
bereavement (Schut, 1999; Stroebe & Schut, 2010) and perfectionism (Slade & Owens, 
1998).  
 In an effort to bridge the gap between dual process theories and humanistic 
counseling, the orientation model seeks to highlight the value of measuring specific dual-
9 
 
 
 
processing dispositions of clients so as to further enhance case conceptualization 
practices in therapy (Wilkinson, 2015). Guided by general dual-process theories and 
applied within an existential framework, the orientation model was designed to benefit 
the therapeutic process by giving counselors of the humanistic persuasion a practical tool 
for assessing important dispositional traits in clients without resorting to diagnostic labels 
or other reductionist methods (Wilkinson, 2015). However, the relationships among the 
variables used in the orientation model have not yet been assessed. Validating such a 
humanistic-existential assessment model for clinical use will grant counselors an 
opportunity to utilize dispositional assessments that lend insight into specific 
characteristics that may serve to either impede or facilitate client growth towards the 
fulfillment of basic psychological needs and adaptive functioning. 
Rationale 
 Although the use of assessment instruments among counselors is on the rise 
(Cashel, 2009), many practitioners and counselor educators maintain that psychological 
testing and assessment is incongruent with the principles guiding counselor identity 
(Neukrug, Peterson, Bonner, & Lomas, 2013). This may be due in no small part to a 
sense that quantitative measures – typically designed to operate as an objective tool for 
assessment and diagnosis - may somehow detract from the personal, non-judgmental 
nature of the positive therapeutic relationship (Clark, 2001).  According to a recent 
inquiry into the use of testing instruments by counselors in the field, there appears to be a 
high prevalence of test use but at a very low average frequency (Peterson, Lomas, 
Neukrug, & Bonner, 2014). This trend holds across counseling sub-specialties, as the 
types of assessments administered differ based on area of specialization and yet the 
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average use of assessments in general remains about the same (Peterson et al., 2014). So 
while counselors across various specializations incorporate some testing and assessment 
in their clinical practices, they tend to do so relatively rarely. 
 In regard to counselor training, multiple studies indicate that counselors feel 
unprepared to conduct assessments in the field (Mellin, Hunt, & Nichols, 2011; Villalba, 
Latus, & Hamilton, 2005) while counselor educators appear largely uninterested in 
teaching assessment courses (Davis, Chang, & McGlothlin, 2005). Uncertainty abounds 
as to the types of assessments that should be taught in masters-level programs; an issue 
which, it has been suggested, should be addressed in a rigorous and standardized manner 
to ensure students are adequately prepared for clinical practice (Peterson, Lomas, 
Neukrug, & Bonner, 2014). However, both counselors and counselor educators alike 
tended to regard the 2001 assessment standards set forth by the Council for Accreditation 
of Counseling and Related Educational Programs (CACREP) as one of the three least 
beneficial core curriculum standards (McGlothlin & Davis, 2004). The 2009 CACREP 
standards remained just as broad and tentative in its suggestions on the use and teaching 
of assessments as its predecessor (Neukrug, Peterson, Bonner, & Lomas, 2013), and the 
2016 core standards appear to differ little in this respect. So while there is widespread 
agreement among counselor educators that assessment courses are an important part of 
training, there is little agreement as to which tests and measures should be emphasized 
and how best to prepare future counselors for conducting assessments in the field 
(Neukrug et al. 2013).  
 Empirical research suggests that seven categories of assessment are particularly 
valuable for counselors across a variety of specializations and clinical roles, including 
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personality, projective, career, intelligence/cognitive, educational/achievement, 
clinical/behavioral, and environmental/interpersonal (Peterson, Lomas, Neukrug, & 
Bonner, 2014). Within this array of categories it appears those assessments taught by 
counselor educators span five practical areas of clinical need including symptom severity, 
diagnostic criteria and psychopathology, problem behaviors, general intelligence, and 
personality-based career compatibility (Wilkinson, 2015). As implemented by 
practitioners, these areas of inquiry are quite useful in terms of providing relevant clinical 
information on client-specific traits and behaviors. However, personality tests have been 
eschewed as insignificant contributors to counseling practice (Boyle, 2008; Epstein, 
2010), and general intelligence tests have been similarly called into question (Seligman, 
1996), while measures of diagnostic criteria and psychopathology, symptom severity, and 
problem behaviors tend to overlook client strengths in favor of limitations (Elkins, 2007). 
 For the purposes of clinical practice, objective measures are designed to provide 
counselors with additional and supplementary insight into client patterns of functioning. 
The elusive qualities of psychological experience and human behavior in general have 
made such assessments a vital part of the counseling field (Scholl, McGowan, & Hansen, 
2012). Yet the philosophical tenets guiding humanistic counseling are viewed by many as 
running contrary to this purpose (Brown, 1972). It has been asserted that psychometric 
procedures are not only reductionistic and antithetical to the humanistic endeavor, but 
that humanistic practices “will always show a preference for qualitative and human 
science research” (Greening, 2002, p. 5). Others have also noted that assessment and 
testing are widely “viewed as incongruent with the qualitative, postmodernist perspective 
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underlying human science methodologies” that is preferentially adopted by those of the 
humanistic persuasion (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006, p. 512).  
 Insight into the subjective experience of the client tends to be favored over 
objective analysis, whereby the individual is regarded as being figuratively reduced to a 
set of a circumscribed categories or labels (Clark, 2001; Scholl, Ray, & Brady-Amoon, 
2014). Furthermore, the humanistic drive to connect with “the person of the client” does 
not naturally lend itself to the use of objective tests and measures insofar as these means 
of assessment are viewed as a way to inadvertently undermine the perceived agency of 
clients (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Yet while this may anecdotally appear to be a 
relevant concern considering the influence of judgment biases on clinical decision-
making (Wood & Tracey, 2009) and therapeutic outcomes (Spengler & Strohmer, 1994), 
no significant evidence supports the notion that assessment use negatively influences how 
counselors engage, support, or regard their clients (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). 
 Alternatively, some psychologists espouse the potential benefits of developing 
humanistic testing and assessment methods despite the philosophical conflicts perceived 
as inherent by opponents of this suggestion (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Such a 
discussion is conspicuously absent from the humanistic counselor education literature, 
despite numerous calls for a greater degree of assessment and testing integration into 
counselor training as a whole (Balkin, 2014; Naugle, 2009; Neukrug et al., 2014). 
Considering the relatively high number of self-identifying humanistic, existential, and 
person-centered counselor educators within the field (Calley & Hawley, 2008), this lack 
of discourse would seem to represent a significant oversight. It may also provide an 
explanation for why assessment and testing remain under-emphasized in master's-level 
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training. If counselor educators and researchers are at some level ideologically opposed 
to psychometric testing due to their humanistic inclinations, then it stands to reason that 
the field would place less active emphasis on training in this area. As such, this issue may 
actually be a consequence of an implicit rather than explicit bias against tests and 
measures. 
 Humanistic counselors indelibly seek to preserve the tenets of humanistic 
philosophy by engaging in practices that emphasize concepts such as subjectivity, 
growth, agency, relationships, and holism (Friedman & MacDonald, 2006). Hesitancy or 
outright rejection of the use of assessment instruments is thus founded upon some sense 
that objective testing conflicts with these basic humanistic tenets, particularly stemming 
from resistance to the notion of the counselor behaving as an expert. To properly combat 
this concern, Friedman and MacDonald (2006) suggest that the assessment process 
should be interactive, facilitate growth-oriented discussions, and rely upon client 
feedback and clarification. Fischer (1979) similarly noted the importance of approaching 
assessment procedures as a descriptive rather than a categorical process in view of the 
“situated intentionality” of clients (p. 116). In other words, testing should be used to 
augment clinical understanding such that it may further inform the primary client 
disclosures of subjective experience rather than serve as an objective substitute. 
 With an eye towards building a humanistic assessment framework for the 
purposes of clinical case conceptualization, Wilkinson (2015) constructed the orientation 
model as a means by which to bridge the gap between objective testing and the 
philosophical tenets upheld by humanistic counselors. It incorporates four empirically-
validated and well-established measures developed by psychologists using confirmatory 
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factor analysis to test hypotheses within pre-established theoretical frameworks and to 
examine specific dispositional variables within individuals. This procedure for 
determining within-individual differences contrasts with those personality measures 
which use exploratory factor analysis to analyze between-individual differences from an 
atheoretical vantage point (Boyle, 2008; Cervone, 2005).  
 As noted by the eminent psychologist Jack Block (1995), properly designed 
psychological models should be “situated within a coherent, intraindividual framework” 
rather than be “overly preoccupied with the study of interindividual differences” (p. 210). 
The orientation model was explicitly designed to serve as just such a client-specific 
framework for humanistic counseling (Wilkinson, 2015). While its basic conceptual 
foundation has been explored, the model's validity remains in question. The purpose of 
this study is thus to validate the orientation model through quantitative methods to 
determine the relationships among the model’s four empirically-validated psychological 
measures. It is thereby proposed that gaining insight into potential relationships among 
the orientation model's four constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and 
introspection can result in an effective case conceptualization model which supplements 
not only humanistic and experiential counseling approaches in particular, but counseling 
practice more generally as well. 
Statement of Purpose 
 The purpose of this study is to test a case conceptualization model of dispositional 
factors and an accompanying assessment tool that can be used by counselors to assess 
client strengths and growth areas early in the therapeutic process. This survey-based 
study will examine the habitual use of dual-process tendencies across four important 
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dimensions of functioning, including cognitive processing styles, attachment styles, 
empathy styles, and introspection styles (Wilkinson, 2015). Four corresponding, 
empirically-validated surveys will be used to measure these dimensions: the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996), the 
Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the Reflection-Rumination 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999).  
Research Questions 
Q1  Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive 
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as 
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the 
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)? 
 
Q2  Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential 
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI, 
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ? 
 
Q3  How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the 
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high 
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale 
of the REI? 
 
Q4  How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the 
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) 
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the 
REI? 
 
Q5  How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured 
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and 
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition 
subscale of the REI? 
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Definition of Key Terms 
Dual-Processing  
 For the purposes of this study, dual processing refers to the theorized notion that 
“humans operate within two information processing systems, an ‘experiential system,’ 
which automatically learns from experience, and a ‘rational system,’ which is a verbal 
reasoning system” (Epstein, 2014, p. 3). It further indicates a dispositional tendency to 
employ either rational or experiential methods of cognitive processing under conditions 
of stress (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The rational system is defined as “intentional, 
analytic, primarily verbal, and relatively affect free” while the experiential system is 
defined as “automatic, preconscious, holistic, associationistic, primarily nonverbal, and 
intimately associated with affect” (Epstein et al., 1996, p. 391). Although the dual 
processing systems generally operate in tandem, stress tends to elicit the preferential, 
dispositional use of one system or the other as a conditioned response.  
Dispositional Attachment 
 For the purposes of this study, dispositional attachment refers to the habitual use 
of emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity as coping strategies under conditions of 
interpersonal stress (Wilkinson, 2015). Based on Differentiation of Self Theory (DST, 
Bowen, 1978), emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity are viewed through the lens of 
dual-process theory as dispositional attachment tendencies that connect with the rational 
and experiential cognitive systems, respectively. Psychological self-differentiation 
enhances aspects of cognitive flexibility and affective resilience that support healthy 
relational boundaries and coping capacities (Bowen, 1978). Maladaptive emotional and 
interpersonal consequences arise from the dispositional attachment tendencies of 
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emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity, including issues related to trust, intimacy, and 
autonomy (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). 
Dispositional Empathy 
  For the purposes of this study, dispositional empathy refers to the habitual use of 
cognitive and emotional empathy as adaptive processing strategies in the formation and 
interpretation of interpersonal relationships (Wilkinson, 2015). Empathy denotes a form 
of cognitive understanding of, or emotional sensitivity towards, the experience of others 
(Davis, 1983; Strayer, 1987). Cognitive empathy involves the mental or psychological 
ability to vicariously experience the perceptual perspective of others (Davis, 1996; 
Strayer, 1987) while emotional empathy involves an affective ability to vicariously 
experience the immediate felt sense of others (Davis, 1980; Gendlin, 1974). An ability to 
experience both forms of empathy is empirically related to healthy interpersonal 
functioning and pro-social behavior (Baron-Cohen, 1995) and contribute to the 
implementation of effective coping strategies (Davis, 1996; Long & Andrews, 1990). 
Dispositional Introspection 
  For the purposes of this study, dispositional introspection refers to the habitual use 
of reflective and ruminative styles of self-focused attention under conditions of stress 
(Wilkinson, 2015). Reflective self-focus denotes a tendency to intellectually analyze 
current, past, and potential future experiences, and is motivated by curiosity (Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999). Ruminative self-focus involves the tendency to chronically assess 
current, past, or potential future experiences for threats, and is motivated by self-
preservation (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999)  While reflective introspection is associated  
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with cognitive distancing from emotional experience, ruminative introspection is related 
to affective immersion in the processing of negative emotions (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 
2005).   
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CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 In this chapter, the review of literature includes the origins, developments, and 
conceptual foundations of modern dual-process theories across cognitive, social, and 
personality psychology. Major theoretical writings and research studies related to dual-
process theories are summarized. A thorough exploration of both the current tripartite 
model of dual-process theory (Stanovich, 2012) and cognitive-experiential theory 
(Epstein, 2014) paves the way for examining the theoretical and practical grounding of 
the orientation model (Wilkinson, 2015). The four constructs and concomitant theories 
included in the model are discussed in detail and potential implications of the model as a 
case conceptualization tool for humanistic and existential counseling are analyzed. 
Dual-Process Theories 
 The histories of philosophy and psychology are replete with inquiries into 
separable aspects of the human mind. From the tripartite divisions of reason, spirit, and 
appetite in Plato's Republic (380 BC/1974) to the dualistic view of conscious and 
unconscious set forth by Freud in The Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953), we have 
long sought to understand mental experience in terms of distinctly functioning 
components. However, the origins of a modern dual-process perspective on information 
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processing can be traced most clearly to psychologist William James (1890/1950), who 
proposed that human thought involves both true reasoning and association. He 
maintained that these are interdependent and facilitative conditions of thought, albeit 
spontaneous in the case of associations and voluntary in the case of reasoning (James, 
1890/1950). Eschewing the psychoanalytic view that the unconscious is a hidden entity 
of the mind, James asserted that some thoughts become subconscious by means of 
habituation inasmuch as they no longer require direct conscious attention yet arise under 
specific facilitative conditions (Weber, 2012). 
 Dual-process theories came to prominence in psychology once again nearly a 
hundred years later with Evans' (1984) two-stage theory of human inference 
distinguishing heuristic from analytical processes. Modern dual-process approaches have 
sought to explain various behavioral outcomes by delineating two mental systems 
according to functionally-distinct yet interdependent information processing capacities 
(Sloman, 2014). While the domain-specific theories seek to identify specific content areas 
in which dual-processing phenomena occur as input-output relations, the generalized 
dual-system theories seek to identify broader principles of human thought that subsume 
those domain-specific accounts (Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). By providing a 
generalized account of higher-level cognition, dual-process theories serve as a conceptual 
umbrella under which both domain-specific phenomena and dual-system models of 
behavioral tendencies are explained and understood. 
 The distinction between dual-process theories as a general account of mental 
phenomena and dual-system theories as a specific account of mental architecture is of 
particular interest herein. Both conceptually and chronologically, general dual-process 
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theories precede dual-system theories, even as the latter have become increasingly 
prominent across various fields of psychology such as social cognition, learning, 
reasoning, and decision-making (Frankish & Evans, 2009). The current relevance of dual-
processing across these specialty areas has been largely due to the rise of dual-system 
theories over the past twenty years (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Rather than view these as 
fully independent approaches, however, it is perhaps more beneficial to recognize that 
dual-system theories attempt to enhance the general dual-process framework by 
introducing additional features that provide a greater degree of specificity to each system 
(Frankish & Evans, 2009).  
 Dual-process theories make a clear distinction between two processing systems, 
but invoke no explanations as to how these systems relate either to one another or to other 
aspects of cognition. Generally speaking, type 1 processes are “characterized as fast, 
effortless, automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and undemanding 
of working memory”, whereas type 2 processes are “slow, effortful, controlled, 
conscious, flexible, decontextualized, and demanding of working memory” (Frankish & 
Evans, 2009, p. 1). In this respect, dual-process theories seek to describe the basic 
capacities of type 1 and 2 processes as observed in experimental testing, but refrain from 
suggesting how they might relate to some of the more dynamic aspects of human 
cognition (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014). There is 
little room for extrapolation in the descriptive approach of dual-process theories that seek 
only to delineate between two types of cognitive processing capacities. 
 Dual-system theories, on the other hand, are far more inclusive and complex. 
Drawing upon far reaching fields of scientific inquiry, dual-system theories typically 
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make reference to ‘System 1’ and ‘System 2’ processes rather than types so as to 
emphasize their evolutionary interdependence in human cognition (Stanovich, 2004). 
While allusions to evolutionary theory are but one hallmark feature of dual-system 
theories, it serves to highlight the movement away from mere description and towards 
advanced explanations of the role and features of the dual processing system. In effect, 
System 1 has been described as an intuitive, pragmatic, associative, implicit, and 
evolutionarily old processing capacity that is independent of general intelligence and 
shared with animals (Frankish & Evans, 2009). In contrast, System 2 is typically 
characterized as a reflective, logical, rule-based, explicit, and evolutionarily recent 
processing capacity that is linked to general intelligence (Frankish & Evans, 2009). 
Extending well beyond the confines of description, dual-systems theories seek to provide 
a comprehensive account of how the systems relate, differ, and combine to explain a 
diverse array of human cognitive processing capacities. 
 For the purposes of this dissertation, the phrase dual-process theory will be used 
in reference to both the general dual-process theories and the more specific dual-system 
theories, as suggested by Frankish and Evans (2009) for convenience and clarity. Since 
dual-system theories are meant to expand upon the foundation established by dual-
process theories without deviating from those basic premises, this equivocation should 
provide readers with a more consistent and coherent understanding of the ideas set forth 
herein as a matter of basic continuity. However, it should be reiterated that the approaches 
remain distinctive in terms of how far they are willing to go in their speculations, despite 
the fact that dual-process and dual-system accounts originate from the same basic, 
underlying tenets. While these nuanced distinctions are surely important for advanced 
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theoretical work in the social and cognitive specialization areas that explore dual-process 
structures and functions, it has been suggested by several dual-process researchers that 
the conceptual underpinnings of both are sufficiently related to warrant a merging of their 
ideas for the purpose of applied practice in counseling and psychotherapy (Anchin, 
Singer, & Magnavita, 2016; Epstein, 2014). 
Modern History of Dual-Process Theories 
 Although dual-process theories gained widespread recognition as a foundational 
concept in the psychological sciences with Evans’ (1984) two-stage theory of human 
inference, at least one major researchers was exploring related concepts more than a 
decade earlier. In studying differences between implicit and explicit learning beginning 
late in the 1960’s, Reber (1993) proposed that two distinct processing systems guide 
human learning and decision-making. He further suggested that a ‘cognitive unconscious’ 
processing system might explain how memories are acquired without explicit awareness 
that learning has taken place (Reber, 1993). Although there has been considerable debate 
as to whether implicit learning occurs with or without some degree of explicit awareness 
(Shanks & St. John, 1994; Redington & Chater, 2002), current neuropsychological 
findings lend support to the idea that human memory functions across multiple and 
distinct neurological systems rather than within a unified or centralized system 
(Carruthers, 2006). 
 While the work of Reber (1993) has often been cited as an early influence on 
dual-processing ideas, it was a series of experiments conducted on deductive reasoning 
tasks that provides the most direct foundation for modern dual-process theories. Seeking 
to explain discrepancies between behaviors and introspective reports similar to those 
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observed by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) in their seminal article on deductive reasoning, 
three separate experiments were launched to explore deductive reasoning fallacies using 
the famous Wason (1966) selection task. Whereas the first provided supporting evidence 
for a matching bias in deductive reasoning (Evans & Lynch, 1973), the second revealed 
that participants tend to explain their selection task choices in quite rational terms despite 
the fact that a conditional, non-logical matching bias actually guided those choices 
(Wason & Evans, 1975).  
 This unexpected outcome led to renewed theorizing on the underlying 
mechanisms at work in those deductive reasoning tasks that invoke non-logical biases yet 
are accompanied by the illusion of logical decision-making (Evans, 1977). The 
explanation proposed by Wason and Evans (1975) was that the introspective reports made 
by participants were actually post hoc rationalizations, indicating that the matching bias 
associated with the Wason selection task is an unconscious response process distinct from 
the rational deductive process activated in terms of participant rationalizations. The 
seminal study published two years later by Nisbett and Wilson (1977) on discrepancies 
between observable participant behaviors and introspective reports served to bring 
widespread scientific attention to this very gap between implicitly-primed cues and 
explicitly-evaluated attributions.  
 The implication of these findings in relation to dual-process accounts of cognition 
were not fully realized until the development of the two-stage theory of human inference 
(Evans, 1984) and then, more comprehensively, the heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning 
(Evans, 1989). During this period, dual-process accounts of various domain-specific 
areas of social cognition came to prominence, including specific theories of persuasion 
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(Chaiken, 1987; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), dispositional attributions (Gilbert, 1989; 
Trope, 1986), impression formation (Brewer, 1988), and prejudice (Devine, 1989). 
However, it was Evans (1984, 1989) who provided the first general dual-process theory 
account of human reasoning and decision-making as distinct types. Both theoretical 
accounts proposed that unconscious heuristics (i.e., type 1 processes) function as a rapid 
form of inductive cognitive processing whereas conscious analytical reasoning (i.e., type 
2 processing) is a slower form of logical or deductive cognition.  
 The conflict between non-logical biases and logical processes was also being 
scrutinized around this time by the economists Tversky and Kahneman (1983) in terms of 
probabilistic judgment and cognitive fallacies. Examining how participants used intuitive 
heuristics to make decisions under circumstance of uncertainty, their research indicated 
that individuals tend to rely upon availability heuristics to make such decisions even 
when this violates the basic conjunction rule, or the rule of formal logic in which the 
probability of two independent events both happening cannot be exceeded by those 
events happening in combination (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). Similar results in studies 
examining the rational theory of choice (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1986) and norm theory (Kahneman & Miller, 1986) eventually led to 
renewed theorizing on the heuristic and analytical elements at work in bounded 
rationality (Kahneman, 2003) and the seminal development of an economic dual-process 
model of decision-making (Kahneman, 2011).  
 It is notable that these ideas developed in separate scientific fields without due 
awareness of their simultaneity. Despite the obvious alignment with the tenets of dual-
process theories, the Nobel Prize winning economist remained unaware of this 
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connection until after the turn of the century (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Similar 
events were unfolding for social cognition researchers attempting to explain 
discrepancies between social behaviors and professed attitudes, as well as the 
automaticity of social judgments (see Bargh, 2006, Wilson, 2002). Dual-process 
approaches to social cognition occurred independently of those advancements made in 
the psychological study of reasoning, as is often the case in disparate areas of research 
(Frankish & Evans, 2009). However, the basic tenets underlying each remains the same, 
with heuristic and analytical processes also used to explain the formation of attitudes, 
judgments, self-regulation, and attributions in social psychology (Bargh, 2006). 
 Conceptual advancements made by dual-process theories of social cognition 
appear primarily to be a result of the interests associated with this field of study itself. 
While research into deductive and inductive reasoning capacities emphasizes controlled 
studies of memory and learning, social cognition research naturally introduces a variety 
of confounding factors due to its emphasis on individual differences and situational 
conditions (Feldman, 2014). This provides researchers of social cognition ample 
opportunity to create expansive models and theories which encompass a broader swath of 
social phenomena with more generalizable social implications than those founds in 
cognitive research alone (Smith & Collins, 2009; Wyer & Srull, 2014). Insofar as the 
study of implicit social cognition has largely become the de facto foundation of social 
psychology research in the last decade (Payne & Gawronski, 2010), it is not surprising 
that some of the most advanced and influential dual process theories have evolved within 
this particular area of inquiry.  
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 Echoing notions of the “cognitive unconscious” as set forth by Reber (1993), the 
development of cognitive-experiential theory (CET; Epstein, 1991) marked a dramatic 
shift towards the integration of emotional processing capacities into dual-process theories 
(Smith & Collins, 2009). By aligning the preconscious experiential system with affective 
capacities, CET not only bridged the gap between cognitive research accounts of heuristic 
influences on deductive reasoning and social cognitive research on self-regulation 
(Epstein, 2003), but made dual-process theories accessible to applied fields such as 
counseling and psychotherapy (Epstein, 1994, 1987). Additionally, rather than view the 
rational system as the more advanced process of cognition, CET (1994, 2003) suggests a 
requisite primacy of the experiential cognitive system due to both its integration with 
affect and its adaptive evolutionary value. While still maintaining that the experiential 
and rational systems are both synchronous and complementary, CET vitalized discussions 
on the contribution of emotion to cognitive processing (Frankish & Evans, 2009). 
 In a return to the descriptions of higher thought processes by William James 
(1905/1977), Sloman (1996) proposed associative and rule-based true reasoning systems 
in an empirical reevaluation of past studies and arguments on deductive reasoning. This 
highly influential article was the first to describe type 1 and type 2 processes as parallel 
computational systems with distinct neurological structures that are guided by unique 
algorithms (Sloman, 2014). Whereas the associative system is reflexive, inferential, and 
pattern-seeking, the rule-based true reasoning system is deliberate, hierarchical, and 
causality-seeking, yet the two function in tandem as complementary approaches to 
reasoning activated under specific circumstances (Sloman, 1996). The activation of either 
system is regarded as context-dependent since the amount of accessible information 
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determines which algorithmic processes are triggered, which in turn depends upon what 
rules the individual has learned in relation to the given context (Sloman, 1996). 
 In effect, this computational approach to reasoning and judgment laid the 
groundwork for the integrative dual-process theories of memory which were to follow 
(Evans, 2009). Although Sloman (2014) made significant revisions to his computational 
dual-process approach so as to merge affective and somatic influences into its theoretical 
structure – much akin to that seen in CEST (Epstein, 2003) – the original algorithmic 
distinction had made its mark. Evans and Over (1996) made similar computational 
assertions that also contributed to this movement, although Evans (2008) still maintains 
that type 1 and type 2 processes are memory-oriented reasoning systems and only 
superficially related to affect. With the computational distinction between an implicit 
system of personal learning and an explicit system of effortful or conscious learning, 
dual-process theories were clearly moving towards rule-based conceptualizations 
(Frankish & Evans, 2009). 
 However, it was the conceptual shift from parallel to overlapping systems of dual-
processing that served as the final impetus for major integrative efforts due to the 
inclusion of input-output processes for the resolution of type 1 and type 2 conflicts 
(Stanovich, 2004). Importantly, it was also within this article that the terms System 1 and 
System 2 were coined (Stanovich, 1999), which would later be brought to prominence 
and near universal usage among theorists and laypersons alike with the seminal article by 
Kahneman and Frederick (2002). Distinguishing between the disparate goals structures of 
System 1 and System 2, Stanovich (1999) promoted the idea that an override of System 1 
by the rational means of System 2 is typically beneficial insofar as System 1 is oriented 
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towards reproduction goals while System 2 is oriented towards coherence goals of agency 
or personhood. Furthermore, experiments using an updated version of the Wason 
selection task identified that System 2 is not only related to general intelligence, but can 
be empirically measured to establish individual difference patterns in deductive reasoning 
abilities (Stanovich, 2004).  
 These results pointed towards the renewed possibility that dual-process theories 
might be integrated by defining System 1 and System 2 in terms of distinct memory 
systems (Smith & Collins, 2009). An integrative memory-based dual process model was 
subsequently developed by Smith and DeCoster (2000) in an attempt to reconcile the 
widening theoretical postulates of various dual process theories while incorporating the 
empirical data linking System 1 and System 2 functions to memory. Proposing that 
associative and rule-based processes are structurally linked to distinct memory systems, 
Smith and DeCoster (2000) asserted that rule-based processes actively consume 
attentional resources and therefore not only require intentional activation by means of a 
motivation impetus, but may be directly influenced by mood and implicit judgments. If 
there is interference with System 2 activation due to some motivational deterrent, then the 
slow-learning System 1 with its pattern-completion tendencies will automatically prime 
cognitive, affective, or behavioral responses stored from contextually similar previous 
experiences (Smith & DeCoster, 2000).  
 While the Smith and DeCoster (2000) model effectively integrated features of 
many dual-process theories into a single computational framework, it was soon argued 
that neither behavior nor emotion were adequately accounted for within the model due to 
the emphasis on information processing and judgment (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Further 
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distinguishing impulsive from reflective processes, other researchers proposed that the 
two distinct memory systems compete for behavioral control, or otherwise elicit 
behavioral responses when the motivational impetus for their activation is particularly 
strong (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). In alignment with the notion of embodied cognition 
which asserts that cognitions are primed by repetitive behaviors (Semin & Smith, 2008), 
this integrative model contains both computational and affective-motivational elements. 
However, its computational basis remains primary, as Strack and Deutsch (2004) 
maintain that affect is merely a byproduct of the reflective and impulsive processes in 
accord with the theory of emotion (Russell, 2003), albeit capable of influencing both 
approach and avoidance motivations as well as habitual inferences that influence 
judgments. 
 Following the integrative model (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), the associative-
propositional model was developed to further account for System 1 and System 2 
evaluative conflicts, suggesting that both dual-process systems have automatic and 
controlled aspects (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Using a spatiotemporal 
framework, it is argued that associations and propositions refer to what a process is doing 
while automatic and controlled refer to when a process has actually been activated 
(Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). In making this distinction, the associative-
propositional model argues both that explicit or rational processes need not be intentional 
even as implicit or associative processes can be accessed by conscious awareness. By 
removing the one-to-one conflation of associative-propositional and automatic-controlled 
pairings, the model effectively suggests that System 1 and System 2 processes may 
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indeed exist on a measurable continuum whereby each process can be activated by the 
other under specific operational conditions (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). 
 The most valuable contribution of both the impulsive-reflective model (Strack & 
Deutsch, 2004) and the associative-propositional model (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 
2006) to dual process theorizing is their mutual interest in clarifying the overlapping 
conditional elements of System 1 and System 2 processes. Most dual-process theories up 
until this point had maintained a certain level of disconnect between dual systems by 
positing a separation of the cognitive architecture of each system while providing for 
some degree of interaction by means of context-dependent cues. However, the 
introduction of affective-motivational components (Strack & Deutsch, 2004) and 
overlapping conditional elements (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006) actually led 
eminent dual-process theorists to consider whether a mediating system might serve to 
“bridge the gap”, so to speak, between System 1 and System 2 processes (Evans, 2008; 
Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich et al., 2014). Dual-process theories also abandoned 
the terms System 1 and System 2 at this point for the terms Type 1 and Type 2, since the 
latter do not insinuate a literal correspondence with discrete brain systems (Stanovich et 
al., 2014). 
 The most current dual-process theories regard the defining feature of Type 1 
processing to be its autonomy, meaning all relevant Type 1 processes work independently 
of higher-order cognitions and are necessarily triggered by specific context-dependent 
cues (Evans, 2009; Stanovich, 2009). As such, the functional overlap between Type 1 and 
Type 2 processes in unidirectional such that Type 2 processes can directly modify or 
“override” Type 1 processes, but Type 1 processes do not exert any such functional 
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control over Type 2 processes (Stanovich et al., 2014).  The stimulus override feature of 
System 2 processing is regarded as an executive inhibitory mechanism, interrupting or 
suppressing System 1 activation in a top-down manner (Evans, 2008). The substitution 
feature of Type 2 processing creates alternative response options when Type 1 responses 
have been suppressed, and involves the higher order capacity to use both hypothetical 
reasoning to consider alternative possible outcomes and cognitive decoupling to 
distinguish between hypothetical simulations and actual sensory representations (Evans, 
2007, 2010; Stanovich, 2009, 2011).  
 By shifting the emphasis away from distinct memory processing systems and 
towards a more integrated view of Type 1 and Type 2 features, current theories suggest 
that Type 2 processing involves two complementary levels: the reflective and algorithmic 
minds (Stanovich et al., 2014). Akin to the suggestion set forth by the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett (2002), this tripartite model was a necessary consequence of introducing a 
higher-order control mechanism into dual-process theories since the “instructions to 
initiate override of Type 1 processing (and to initiate simulation activities) must be 
controlled by cognitive machinery at a higher level than the decoupling machinery itself” 
(Stanovich et al., 2014, p. 85). So while the algorithmic Type 2 processes are related to 
fluid intelligence and cognitive abilities, the reflective Type 2 processes that initiate Type 
1 override sequences are related to epistemic dispositions of thought and cognitive styles 
(Stanovich et al., 2014).  
 This bifurcation of Type 2 processing into reflective and algorithmic systems has 
an important consequence inasmuch as it reintroduces the notion of cognitive styles and 
individual differences into dual-process theory discourse. So long as dual-processes are 
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regarded as distinct operating systems there is inadequate room for speculation as to how 
individual dispositions or cognitive styles might be understood in a dual-process 
framework (Epstein, 2014). However, the introduction of a tripartite structure with 
higher-order override capacities for algorithmic and Type 1 processes alters the 
theoretical landscape. It also allows for the integration of research findings across both 
social and cognitive psychology while opening new discussions in areas such as habit 
formation (Evans, 2008; Wood, Labrecque, Lin, & Runger, 2014), free will and 
determinism (Baumeister & Bargh, 2014), and morality (Amit, Gottlieb, & Greene, 
2014).  
 Certain avenues of research interest such as metacognition (Greifeneder & 
Schwarz, 2014; Schwarz, 2015) and emotion regulation (Sheppes & Gross, 2012) have 
been successfully applied in dual-process frameworks as a result, based on theorizing that 
such constructs might be best understood in relation to experiential and rational dual 
processes in equal measure. Studies on Metacognition, particularly those guided by the 
tenets of feelings-as-information theory (Schwarz, 2012), indicate that higher order 
reflective processing is mediated by both declarative (i.e., algorithmic system) 
information as well as experiential (i.e., associative) information (Greifeneder & 
Schwarz, 2014). Emotion regulation studies have shown that associative forms of 
heuristic-based down regulation not only occur, but are often as effective as those more 
deliberative emotion regulation processes which serve as the traditional basis for 
understanding up regulated and down regulated strategies (Gallo, Keil, McCulloch, 
Rockstroh, & Gollwitzer, 2011; Sheppes & Gross, 2014).  
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 Such inquiries into metacognitive and emotion regulation processes through the 
lens of dual process theory have been made possible by the distinction between 
algorithmic processes of fluid intelligence and reflective processes of cognitive styles. As 
a natural extension of this new perspective, the notion that the charting of unique dual-
process patterns might lend insight into between-individual personality differences has 
also gained broader appeal. This is not to say that all dual process theorists agree that 
individual differences in experiential and rational processing can be assessed using a 
dual-process framework. On the contrary, many maintain that regardless of introducing a 
reflective system through the tripartite model, personality-based assessments of 
dispositional dual processing styles remain untenable because the experiential system and 
two-part analytic system, although highly interrelated, still do not operate on a 
measurable continuum (Evans, 2010, 2013; Stanovich, 2011, 2012).  
 Instead, cognitive styles apply to the reflective system alone, and therefore 
individual differences in cognitive style can only be determined in regards to that 
particular system (Stanovich, 2012; Stanovich et al., 2014). The associative foundation of 
Type 1 processing means that it operates autonomously to the extent that implicit rules, 
conditioned patterns of response, and heuristic principles do not rely on higher-order 
control systems to function appropriately (Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2012). In effect, it is 
claimed that the autonomy and automaticity of the system prevents Type 1 processes 
from being considered in terms of dispositional differences because all Type 1 systems 
work based upon a universal set of process-based principles regardless of individual 
content-based distinctions. The reason for introducing cognitive styles into the modern 
tripartite model is therefore not to suggest that dual-process theories can provide new 
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insight into a dual-process perspective on individual differences, but rather to suggest that 
those dispositional styles of cognition which have been long examined in personality and 
social psychology can now be effectively located within the structure of tripartite models. 
 By introducing a new operating principle into the computational tripartite model, 
research evidence of variations in specific processing capacities that were once viewed as 
functioning within a single control system are now understood to be a result of operations 
in separate control systems. For example, scores on general intelligence tests and 
dispositional constructs assessed using the five-factor model of personality have always 
been weakly or moderately correlated (Austin & Deary, 2002; Bates & Shieles, 2003; 
Kanazawa, 2004). The tripartite model serves to explain this as a consequence of general 
intelligence operating within the algorithmic Type 2 system and dispositional personality 
factors operating in the reflective Type 2 system (Stanovich, 2012). Intelligence is thus 
viewed as a function of the algorithmic mind in particular, rather than as a central feature 
of the mind in general.  
 Another dispositional construct of personality which has shown weak correlations 
with general intelligence is need for cognition, or the dispositional tendency towards, and 
enjoyment of, effortful thinking (Epstein, 1996; Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Whereas a high 
need for cognition indicates a tendency to “seek, acquire, think about, and reflect back on 
information to make sense of stimuli, relationships, and events in the world,” a low need 
for cognition indicates a tendency to “rely on others (e.g., celebrities and experts), 
cognitive heuristics, or social comparison processes to provide this structure” (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996, p. 198). As a thinking disposition, the tripartite model 
maintains that the need for cognition construct is embedded in the reflective mind as a 
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high-intensity processing system linked to metacognition (Greifeneder & Schwarz, 2014) 
and propositional evaluations (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006).  
 The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) was thus developed to 
assess effortful cognitive tendencies as a stable dispositional trait rather than a situational 
variable. The dual-process theories that immediately followed drew some degree of 
inspiration and insight from this construct insofar as it reflects an implicit distinction 
between heuristic and rational processes (Epstein, 2014). However, its actual integration 
into those traditional dual-process theories was inhibited by its individual differences 
foundation. It was not until the development of the tripartite model and its addition of the 
reflective mind some twenty-five years later that the need for cognition construct was 
finally integrated into mainstream dual-process theories (Epstein, 2014). As has been 
shown, the proposed benefit of a tripartite view on dual-processing is its enhanced range 
of conceptual inclusiveness, particularly when compared with the natural limitations 
imposed by a bifurcated dual process model.  
 However, a relative outlier in the dual-process community of social psychology 
theorists used the need for cognition construct much earlier as the foundation for an 
individual differences measure of dual-processing tendencies. With the development of 
cognitive-experiential self theory, Epstein (1990) sought to create a modified version of 
the Need for Cognition Scale to gauge dispositional tendencies in rationality while 
simultaneously developing the Faith in Intuition Scale (FI) as a conceptual counterpoint 
assessment to measure dispositional experiential tendencies. The conceptual positioning 
of cognitive-experiential self theory, now called cognitive-experiential theory (CET; 
Epstein, 2014), was such that it conflicted with most of the early dual-process theories 
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due to its emphasis on the continuity of rational-analytic (i.e., Type 2) and experiential-
intuitive (i.e., Type 1) processing capacities. Rather than regard the two as distinct 
systems as other theorists were wont to do, CET held that the rational and intuitive 
systems were not only highly integrated, but were nuanced enough to warrant an 
examination of each system in terms of individual differences (Epstein, 2014). 
 The design of the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; (Epstein et al., 1996) 
clearly reflects this perspective, as the development of an experiential scale presupposes 
that Type 1 associative processes reflect unique dispositional traits rather than function as 
a form of universal processing capacities. According to CET, this perspective becomes 
accessible by regarding both experiential-intuitive and rational-analytic processes as 
cognitive systems, but then further allowing that experiential processing is intimately 
related to affect as an emotionally driven cognitive system (Epstein, 2003). The overlap 
prescribed to the systems in CET is such that rational and experiential processes serve to 
jointly influence all behaviors, even as their interaction provides the grounds for the likes 
of metaphors, creativity, and wisdom (Epstein, 1994, 2014; Epstein et al., 1996).  
 Whereas most dual-process theories have sought to limit the number of 
descriptive factors used to distinguish Type 1 and Type 2 processes, CET has used its 
experiential and affective foundation to expand the list considerably. Akin to other dual 
process theories, CET maintains that the experiential-intuitive Type 1 system is indeed 
“fast, effortless, automatic, nonconscious, inflexible, heavily contextualized, and 
undemanding of working memory”, while the rational-analytic type 2 system is “slow, 
effortful, controlled, conscious, flexible, decontextualized, and demanding of working 
memory” (Frankish & Evans, 2009, p. 1). However, CET goes further by including 
38 
 
 
 
hedonic principles, an outcome-oriented focus, and image-based encoding in the 
experiential system, while including logic-reality principles, a process-oriented focus, and 
symbolic-linguistic encoding in the rational system (Epstein, 2003).  
 Based on aspects of this list, it is perhaps unsurprising that elements of 
psychodynamic theory are a mainstay of CET from its origins (Epstein, 1984) through to 
its most current iteration (Epstein, 2014). Regardless of its conceptual underpinnings, 
however, CET remains a dual-process theory quite distinct from traditional 
psychodynamic approaches due to the integrative nature of its dual systems. The overlap 
of the hedonic-principled experiential system and reality-principled rational system is 
mediated by the balancing of four basic needs as advanced by other major theorists: to 
maximize pleasure and minimize pain (Freud, 1900/1953), to experience relatedness 
(Bowlby, 1988), to maintain a coherent and stable conceptual system of self (Rogers, 
1951), and to enhance self-esteem (Allport, 1961). Each of these basic needs are met by 
means of a coordinated effort between experiential and rational systems, even as a lack of 
coordination leads to negative psychological consequences due to personality disruption 
(Epstein, 2003).  
 From this idea that multiple psychological needs are fulfilled by the balancing of 
dual-process systems arises the obvious question as to how each system uniquely 
influences needs fulfillment. According to CET, the experiential-intuitive and rational-
analytic processes are distinct yet overlapping information processing modalities, which 
indicates that each lends a particular set of computational systems to the task of needs 
fulfillment (Epstein, 2014). It further indicates that adaptive as well as maladaptive needs 
fulfillment strategies can arise from the use of either system. There is no sense in which 
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one system is “superior” to the other, as each operates to fulfill the basic psychological 
needs but serve this purpose by means of a complex yet integrated functional apparatus. 
Albeit by quite different means, both have evolved to enhance organismic survival as 
well as stability, and have an equal capacity to formulate adaptive responses under a 
variety of environmental conditions (Epstein, 2003; Evans, 2009).  
 It is at precisely this point that the orientation model (Wilkinson, 2015) intercedes 
to suggest that understanding how dispositional tendencies to utilize one system or the 
other, particularly under conditions of stress, might lend insight into both the adaptive 
and maladaptive habitual patterns employed by clients to resolve psychological conflicts 
and to enhance needs fulfillment. While CET has extended a similar proposition in terms 
of psychotherapeutic approaches, its emphasis has been specifically directed towards 
clinical methods for instantiating therapeutic changes to the experiential system (Epstein, 
2014). It is surmised that such changes can occur either by “the use of the rational system 
to correct and train the experiential system,” or by “the provision of emotionally 
significant corrective experiences, communicating with the experiential system in its own 
medium” (Epstein, 2003, p. 176).  
 As a psychodynamic theory of personality, CET asserts that its tenets can provide 
a specific and comprehensive approach to counseling and psychotherapy. It thus serves as 
both a theoretical framework of personality and a practical methodology for clinical 
practices. The orientation model makes no such claims about global personality, as its 
primary function is to combine the dual-process framework with established scientific 
knowledge on dispositional characteristics to elucidate how the use of habitual strategies 
can either impede or facilitate needs fulfillment and adaptive functioning (Wilkinson, 
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2015). Its emphasis is thus on the practical consequences of adaptive and maladaptive 
dual-processing rather than a comprehensive explanation of personality formation 
(Epstein, 2014).  
 Furthermore, it approaches the issue of clinical methodology from an alternative 
and as yet unexamined angle, namely within a humanistic-existential counseling 
approach. In this respect, the orientation model was designed to inform counselors on 
general patterns of client processing rather than be applied as part of a comprehensive 
diagnostic taxonomy for psychopathologies and symptom evaluation (Epstein, 2003, 
2014). The orientation model works within the confines of a more restrictive set of 
guiding principles than CET, and is meant to be applied in a far more particular way.  
Theoretical Stance of the Orientation Model 
 The orientation model is a humanistic-existential assessment tool for clinical use 
that gives humanistic counselors a means by which to determine the influence of client 
dispositional traits on adaptive functioning without resorting to diagnostic labels or other 
reductionist practices. The most basic, shared tenet of dual process theories is the notion 
of dual processing itself. Whether discussed in terms of divergent systems with separate 
processing capacities, parallel systems with overlapping functions, or tripartite systems 
with hierarchical processing conditions, all dual-process theories presuppose that these 
systems impart particular environmental advantages by means of uniquely adaptive 
processing strategies. From this fundamental position, the orientation model asserts that 
understanding how individuals uniquely differ in the expression and use of dual 
processing capacities can benefit personal development, insight, and self-awareness. By 
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extension, equipping counselors with an assessment tool for recognizing such within-
individual differences can confer the same basic advantages in the clinical realm. 
 So dual process theories consistently maintain that two processing capacities are 
at work in all human activities. A diverse array of terms have been applied to each 
processing system (for a review, see Stanovich, West, and Toplak, 2014). The first set of 
processes include terms such as System 1, Type 1, heuristic, automatic, implicit, 
reflexive, associative, stimulus-bound, intuitive, and experiential. The second set of 
processes have been referenced as System 2, Type 2, systematic, explicit, rule-based, 
conscious, rational, analytic, higher-order, and propositional. For the purposes of the 
orientation model, two particular terms are applied in all references to dual-processing 
systems: experiential and analytic. These have been chosen primarily as a means of 
ensuring internal consistency, but also due to the relative ease with which such terms 
might be assimilated into professional counseling practices and discourse. 
Dispositional Analytic Processes 
 The analytic system uses inferential and deductive cognitive processes to solve 
problems aid in decision-making, and optimize outcomes. Logic and language form the 
basis of its processing capacity, and in this respect it operates sequentially and encodes 
information in terms of abstract symbols like words and numbers. Accurate evaluation is 
therefore a primary function of the analytic system, whereby it assesses causal 
relationships between stimuli and outcomes in order to enhance the predictive capabilities 
of the individual. In this respect, the ability to predict future outcomes also serves as a 
control mechanism, providing a means by which an individual can consciously learn 
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ways to increase or decrease the probability of a given outcome by enacting certain 
behaviors and manipulating environmental conditions.  
 Such predictive, cause-and-effect abilities are generally slow by processing 
standards, requiring considerable cognitive effort and consuming substantial cognitive 
resources. Guided by the reality principle, the analytic system is motivated by the 
accuracy of inferential logic and therefore emphasizes objective reasoning over 
subjective notions such as desires or feelings. In this respect, it is a highly differentiated, 
integrated, and organized system that operates from the level of adaptive principles, 
making it highly prone to conscious change based solely on insight and evidence. The 
analytic system is also oriented towards the delay of action, such that the hope or promise 
of future rewards can be prioritized over immediate gratification. Generally affect-free, it 
works from cost-benefit analyses in this respect since it remains uninfluenced by the 
emotional cues that drive behavioral impulsivity. 
Dispositional Experiential Processes  
 Just like the analytic system, the experiential system functions to solve problems, 
aid in decision making, and optimize outcomes. However, it does so through the use of 
associative, heuristic, and affect-imbued cognitive processes that have been learned 
automatically through experience rather than deduced through a logical apparatus. Its 
processing capacity is primarily imagery-based, encoding information non-verbally rather 
than through abstract symbols. Pattern recognition is a primary function of the 
experiential system, which operates unconsciously and yet “nevertheless guides thought 
and inquiry towards a hunch or hypothesis about the nature of the coherence in question” 
(p. 23). Unconscious pattern recognition provides a means by which to assess threats and 
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opportunities in the environment, making emotional cues and intuitive prompts important 
survival tools that are laden with rapidly-processed information.  
 Such associative thinking is rapid by processing standards, consumes few 
cognitive resources, and requires little cognitive effort as a result. The hedonic principle 
guides the experiential system, as the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain serve an 
adaptive evolutionary function. However, it is a crudely integrated system that operates in 
a context-specific, categorical, and disorganized manner, making it highly susceptible to 
biases and misinterpretations. It is also highly resistant to change, as the encoding process 
for the experiential system requires either rote repetitiveness to shift habitual responses or 
the onset of affectively-intense experiences to reorganize its operating conditions. As an 
associative and affect-driven system, its rapid processing capacity orients it towards 
impulsive, habitual, or otherwise immediate actions that may or may not be adaptive 
under a given set of circumstances. However, the automatic associations that are derived 
from observation are often highly accurate representations of the environment, making 
the experiential system a powerful tool for assessment and action. 
Conceptual Implications for Counseling 
 The primary benefit of the orientation model is its unique assessment of client 
dual-processing dispositions related to the cognitive, attachment, empathic, and 
introspective constructs. Rather than being a substitute for other assessments or clinical 
judgment, it acts as an informational supplement which can enhance both in the treatment 
process. Integrative, assimilative, trans-theoretical and multi-theoretical models of 
psychotherapy provide specific formulas for thinking about presenting problems and goal 
development (Norcross & Goldfried, 2005). However, the orientation model and measure 
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provide informative data sets about dispositional client tendencies which can be applied 
within such formulas for thinking about presenting problems and goal development. 
 Bringing together a series of dispositional measures from different psychological 
theories into a cohesive framework for the purpose of case conceptualization can provide 
counselors with extremely relevant client information prior to treatment. The orientation 
model and its corresponding assessment aim to merge these notable and distinctive 
theories into a system specifically designed for counselors to use in gauging important 
individual differences in client behavioral patterns. By incorporating theoretically-derived 
measures into a dual processing framework, counselors can determine important client 
variables within an easily conceptualized thinking/feeling spectrum. Assessment results 
can be readily applied in counseling, lending counselors information on client attributes 
that support the interpretation of behaviors, symptoms, and presenting problems. 
 A significant portion of the case conceptualization process involves making 
calculated interpretations of client behaviors and motivations based on widely varying 
degrees of client-provided information (Falvey, 2001). Whether incorporating results 
from assessment tools or comparing and contrasting verbal reports and observations of 
client non-verbal behaviors, counselors must attempt to conceptualize the client's 
experience by combining clinical experience, theoretical viewpoints, cognitive heuristics, 
and intuitive leanings to arrive at an accurate clinical judgment (Falvey, 2001; 
Kleinmuntz, 1990). Although aspects of both the art and the science of counseling merge 
in this process of interpretation, there is much to be said for trading anecdotal evidence 
for empirical data when possible. Similar to how clinical symptoms are monitored 
through highly specified measures, the orientation model provides counselors with trans-
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diagnostic information on client dispositional characteristics that can be readily applied in 
the process of case conceptualization. 
Existential Framework of the Orientation Model 
 Whereas dual-processing provides the theoretical foundation for the orientation 
model and its constructs, an existential framework serves as the conceptual basis for 
adopting each particular construct within the model. In accordance with the notion of 
Lebenswelt, or phenomenological lifeworld (Husserl, 1936/1970), the orientation model 
frames individual processing styles in terms of three dimensions of human experience. 
These include the Umwelt or physical world, the Mitwelt or social world, and the 
Eigenwelt or personal world (Binswanger, 1946/1958). As applied in existential 
psychology, therapists are encouraged to actively seek understanding around each of the 
three dimensions so as to gain insight into the phenomenological lifeworld of clients 
(May, 1967). It has also been asserted that each dimension provides unique information 
on client styles of interpretation and interaction rooted in dual-processing (Wilkinson, 
2015). 
 Rather than perceive these dimensions as disparate or otherwise disconnected 
aspects of persons, each is inextricably linked by means of intentionality (May, 1969). 
Through an existential-phenomenological lens, intentionality “refers to a state of being, 
and involves, to a greater or lesser degree, the totality of the person’s orientation to the 
world at that time” (May, 1969, p. 234). In this respect, the phrase “human experience” is 
understood to involve structures of consciousness such that the entirety of experiential 
phenomena – thoughts, feelings, behaviors, motivations, understandings, imaginings, and 
the like – are included (Husserl, 1936/1970). So from the standpoint of a 
46 
 
 
 
phenomenological investigation of intentionality, Umwelt is the conscious inner-world, 
Eigenwelt is the unconscious inner-world, and Mitwelt is the with-world of social 
relationships with others (Diamond, 2014; May, 1969).  
 In line with the humanistic penchant for considering the whole person, then, 
explorations of the Lebenswelt from an existential perspective must involve all 
dimensions of the phenomenological lifeworld. Furthermore, each dimension must be 
viewed with an understanding that intentionality is an encompassing subjective 
experience of both the conscious and unconscious inner world as well as the point of 
interface and interpretation of others in the social world (Diamond, 2014). In other words, 
the phenomenological lifeworld is a consequence of that fundamental property of 
consciousness known as intentionality, which is in turn understood in the frame of 
existential inquiry to be composed of multiple experiential dimensions. Rather than view 
the dimensions of Lebenswelt as three disconnected aspects of human consciousness, it is 
perhaps more appropriate to suggest that each represents a particular mode of conscious 
engagement with the world.  
 By regarding the phenomenological lifeworld dimensions as modes of conscious 
engagement rather than distinct aspects of consciousness, a question arises as to how 
subjective experience is mediated between, or transitions among, each of the modes. 
Intentionality is taken to be an indivisible structure of conscious experience in the 
existential and phenomenological traditions (Diamond, 2014; Husserl, 1936/1970; May, 
1969), which contributes to the humanistic ideal of the whole person as a seeking towards 
stability and coherence in self-structures (Rogers, 1951). This would seem to suggest a 
sense in which lifeworld dimensions are fluid, since maintaining the coherence of 
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conceptual systems requires an ability to integrate highly disparate information 
processing inputs into a meaningful gestalt. Without such an integrative capacity our 
experiences would essentially be fractured or disorganized rather than stable or coherent, 
resulting in threats to the phenomenal self (Snygg & Combs, 1949). 
 The orientation model proposes that the lifeworld dimensions can be understood 
in relation to one another by considering how those psychological capacities serve as 
mediators of the conscious engagement modes. In other words, the tendency towards 
systemic coherence of the phenomenological lifeworld gives rise to certain facilitative 
processing capacities, each of which are regarded as a natural consequence of interaction 
among the dimensions. As seen in the diagram for the orientation model (Figure 1), each 
of the Lebenswelt dimensions serves as a sort of “cornerstone” of subjective human 
experience. The orientation model constructs, however, represent distinct methods of 
interpreting subjective experiences both within and between those phenomenological 
lifeworld dimensions. Insofar as these dimensions are particular modes of conscious 
engagement which combine to represent a personal worldview, the orientation model 
constructs are particular methods by which we attempt to process the relationship 
between those worldviews so as to maintain the stability of our self-structure (Wilkinson, 
2015). 
 Therefore, the orientation model posits four styles of interpretation derived from 
the combined elements of lifeworld dimensions (Wilkinson, 2015). The cognitive 
orientation is an interpretation of personal experience in contact with the physical world, 
or the mediating consequence of the inner unconscious world (i.e., Eigenwelt) combining 
with the inner conscious world (i.e., Umwelt). The attachment orientation is an 
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interpretation of personal experience in contact with other subjects, or the mediating 
consequence of the inner unconscious world (i.e., Eigenwelt) combining with the social 
with-world of others (i.e., Mitwelt). The empathic orientation is an interpretation of how 
other subjects experience the physical world, or the mediating consequence of the inner 
conscious world (i.e., Umwelt) combining with the social with-world of others (i.e., 
Mitwelt). One conceptual outlier, the introspective orientation, is regarded as a direct 
indication of how memory and imagination are habitually utilized to process personal 
experiences within the Eigenwelt, or inner unconscious world of introspective processing 
(Wilkinson, 2015). 
 Gathering information on client worldviews may therefore grant counselors the 
opportunity to discern unique styles of interpretation that directly influence the 
phenomenal lifeworld experience of those clients. While the relationship between 
presenting problems and worldviews is not such that direct predictions can be made, 
information about particular worldviews can certainly provide a lens through which to 
interpret presenting problems and clinically relevant symptoms. The orientation model is 
guided by this basic supposition and asserts that a basic understanding of dispositional 
dual-processing styles actually contextualizes, or provides a general rationale for, many 
of the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors that clients present with in counseling. As such, 
the active identification of habitual client tendencies can support strengths-based 
therapeutic approaches which capitalize on adaptive client strategies and modify those 
areas in need of growth.  
 A caveat is important to note at this juncture, as the orientation model diagram is 
not meant to be a representation of the notion of self or other such related constructs. The 
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dynamic nature of human experience involves a complex and diverse range of factors that 
can neither be reduced to nor adequately encompassed within an applied psychological 
model, and thus the orientation model itself is not designed to signify a complete notion 
of either self or personality. Rather, the orientation model diagram serves as a visual 
representation of how dispositional tendencies may relate to the proposed dimensions of 
human experience set forth by existential notions of the Lebenswelt, or phenomenological 
lifeworld of individuals.  
Constructs of the Orientation Model 
 Each measure of the orientation model was chosen based on distinct conceptual 
parallels to the cognitive and experiential positions found in dual process theories. 
Although an existential framework provides the grounds for including each broad 
construct in the model, it remains necessary to clearly define each construct in theoretical 
terms. The orientation model asserts that a dual process approach to the four existential 
orientations can be interpreted through four corresponding theoretical lenses. These 
include the cognitive orientation of cognitive-experiential theory (Epstein, 2014), the 
attachment orientation of differentiation of self theory (Bowen, 1978), the empathic 
orientation of the social-cognitive simulation theory of empathy (Rameson & Lieberman, 
2009), and the introspective orientation of objective self-awareness theory (Duval & 
Wicklund, 1972). 
 The cognitive orientation, founded upon Cognitive-Experiential Theory (CET; 
Epstein, 2014), distinguishes between analytic and experiential modes of information 
processing, with clinical implications in terms of how individuals generally conceptualize 
and communicate their worldviews. Dual process theories generally maintain that 
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experiential processing represents a default capacity for handling daily functions whereas 
analytic processing is primed by new or unexpected situations or environmental 
conditions. As an account of individual differences, CET maintains that experiential and 
analytic processing capacities differ widely between-individuals, and represent distinct 
within-individual processing styles (Epstein, 2014). Furthermore, CET suggests that 
anxiety-provoking or otherwise stressful situations tend to exacerbate habitual processing 
tendencies, leading individuals to the preferential use of either experiential or analytic 
capacities under stressful conditions. 
 The attachment orientation, derived from Differentiation of Self Theory (DST; 
Bowen, 1978), distinguishes between emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity with 
clinical implications in terms of interpersonal interactions, relationship difficulties, and 
views on relational intimacy and autonomy. Emphasizing the psychological importance 
of individuation, differentiation of self suggests that cognitive and emotional functioning 
is optimized by an ability to maintain healthy interpersonal boundaries (Bowen, 1976). 
As a relational construct, differentiation also suggests an ability to clearly distinguish 
between a sense of oneself and the experiences of others, such that the individual takes 
responsibility for their own thoughts, feelings, and behaviors without experiencing undue 
accountability for the thoughts, feelings, and behaviors of others (Bowen, 1978). 
Furthermore, DST asserts that any personal vulnerability to emotional reactivity or 
emotional cutoff is naturally exacerbated by stressful interpersonal conditions (Bowen, 
1976). 
  The empathic orientation is based upon the social-cognitive simulation theory of 
empathy (Rameson & Lieberman, 2009) which distinguishes between propositional and 
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experiential forms of empathy. In this respect, it signifies an interpersonal ability to 
conceptualize the perspective of others (i.e., cognitive empathy) and to emotionally 
attune to the affective experience of others (i.e., emotional empathy), respectively. 
According to simulation theories of mind, accurate empathy stems from an ability to 
attribute mental states to others and infer potential intentions through a dynamic process 
of mental simulation or modeling (Baron-Cohen, 1995). Social-cognitive simulation 
theory suggests that such mental modeling can occur in either an experiential “as-if” 
mode consisting of affective and cognitive conditions, or a propositional mode composed 
of controlled meta-cognitions without affect (Rameson & Lieberman, 2009). 
 The introspective orientation takes its mark from objective self-awareness theory 
(OSA; Wicklund & Duval, 1972), which asserts that self-focused attention is a primary 
feature of human consciousness and a requisite condition of self-awareness. Variations in 
self-attentiveness as a state-based or situational tendency are regarded as an important 
aspect of self-consciousness, whereby an individual takes oneself as an object of 
awareness rather than a subject of first-person, immersive experience (Silvia & Duval, 
2001). Additionally, OSA provides a conceptual framework for exploring trait-based or 
dispositional tendencies in the use of self-focused attention. Reflection and rumination 
are introspective methods of assessing and resolving self-standard discrepancies, and 
individual differences in the use of these constructs lend insight into how introspective 
strategies influence adjustment and coping (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). As such, each 
signifies a particular tendency to attend to introspected events based on intellectual 
curiosity about the self and sensing threats directed toward the self, respectively. 
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 In the following section, each of the orientation modes are discussed in terms of 
the theoretical tenets on which they are founded as well as the corresponding constructs 
that bridge the gap between each theory and the dual-process framework. Each of these 
particular sets of constructs were chosen to represent the overarching theories because 
they appear to operate according to dual-process principles of analytic and experiential 
processing and they each have well-established, empirically-validated measures that have 
been developed using confirmatory factor analysis. For the empathic and introspective 
orientations, additional 2x2 models taken from the literature have been included to draw 
attention to the potentially robust descriptive power of each set of constructs. Finally, 
implications for counseling are briefly discussed. 
Cognitive Orientation: Analytic  
& Experiential Processes 
 
 It is important to recognize that a key difference between CET and other current 
dual-process theories is that CET claims that the experiential and analytic systems are 
both types and styles of cognitive processing (Epstein, 1994). In other words, each system 
functions as part of the immutable cognitive architecture, but can also be measured in 
terms of individual differences on a continuum of dispositional cognition styles (Epstein, 
1999, 2003). This position stands in stark contrast to many dual-process theories which 
assert that the cognitive architecture does not reflect stable personality traits (Evans, 
2009). As a consequence, dual-process theorists that emphasize system types are 
generally unwilling to suggest that dispositional styles of processing can be derived by 
means of assessments or measures (Evans, 2009). In contrast, CET asserts that the value 
of dual-process theory lies in its ability to explain individual differences. 
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 Therefore, CET distinguishes between the analytic and experiential aspects of 
human dual-processing using an individual-differences measure to assess how often these 
interdependent but qualitatively distinct cognitive capacities are typically used. Mounting 
evidence suggests that while both systems regularly contribute to daily functioning, 
individuals tend to preferentially rely on one over the other, particularly when under 
stress (Epstein, 2014; Pacini & Epstein, 1996). CET provides a theoretical framework for 
understanding why we encounter such remarkable individual variations in analytic and 
experiential processing, and has provided a wealth of insight into otherwise discrepant 
empirical outcomes related to coping, adjustment, intimacy, individuation, optimism, 
stereotypical thinking, and problem solving (Epstein, 2014). 
 While the experiential system operates in tandem with affective processing, it is 
not reducible to affect because it is a cognitive system. Affect influences cognitive 
processes through what CET refers to as vibes, or a subset of vague feelings that are 
difficult to articulate yet are not beyond immediate awareness. Positive vibes can include 
feelings of gratification, calmness, anticipation, and well-being, while negative vibes can 
include feelings of edginess, tension, apprehension, agitation, or disquietude (Epstein, 
2003). This is quite similar to phenomenological notions of embodiment (Merleau-Ponty, 
1962), and inheres within the “felt sense” of experiential psychotherapy (Gendlin, 1974) 
and the “bodily” (Yontef, 1979) or “gut” (Kepner, 2003) feelings of gestalt approaches. 
Such vibes are an expression of preconscious awareness, or the recognition of patterns in 
our immediate experience that evoke subtle memories of similar past experiences 
(Epstein, 2003).  
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 The analytic translation of such experiential vibes results in explanations and, at 
times, rationalizations that can interfere with the interpretation of these often informative 
subsets of feelings (Epstein, 2014). This is not meant to downplay the value of analytic 
processing in counseling, as reasoning and evidence maintain a crucial role in the 
development of self-awareness and insight. Instead, it is meant to highlight the value of 
experiential processing from a humanistic-existential perspective. CET asserts that by 
understanding both how the experiential system operates and how to interpret its cues, 
more effective cognitive processing can take place that improves mental health outcomes. 
Insofar as creativity, empathy, and wisdom may arise from the interplay of analytic and 
experiential processing (Epstein, 2003), counselors can apply their knowledge of how 
clients preferentially use each system to develop treatment approaches that improve the 
balanced use of the interconnected and equally important styles of cognition.   
Attachment Orientation: Processes of  
Emotional Cutoff & Emotional  
Reactivity 
 
 Bowen (1978) established differentiation of self theory (DST) to highlight the 
influence of interpersonal relationships on intrapersonal functioning, suggesting that 
individuation contributes to healthy cognitive and emotional outcomes. Higher levels of 
differentiation are regarded as adaptive, and thus individuation reflects an enhanced 
capacity for personal autonomy, self-confidence, and authenticity (Bowen, 1978). Lower 
levels of differentiation are a consequence of pressure towards in-group conformity, 
resulting in a desire for acceptance and approval-seeking that can stymie personal 
development (Bowen, 1978). While emotional interdependence is viewed as an important 
aspect of human functioning, DST suggests that the highly differentiated individual 
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places a realistic sense of value on interpersonal relationships without allowing the 
emotionality of conflict or suggestion to interfere with personal decision-making (Bowe, 
1978). Effectively navigating relationships requires an ability to rationally distinguish 
oneself from others, even as it requires that one recognize when reliance on others is 
adaptive. 
 According to Skowron and Dendy (2004), DST also suggests that one's level of 
adaptive intellectual and emotional individuation has far-reaching implications in terms 
of dispositional attachment styles. In alignment with attachment theory research, the 
concept of differentiation is largely descriptive rather than explanatory and emphasizes 
the impact of family dynamics on habitual interpersonal response patterns, emotional 
stability, and autonomous functioning (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). Just as maladaptive 
patterns of attachment are considered in terms of excessive approach and avoidance 
tendencies, the maladaptive consequences of differentiation are separated into the 
approach style of emotional reactivity and the avoidance style of emotional cutoff 
(Skowron & Dendy, 2004). As such, emotional reactivity stems from anxious or 
preoccupied attachment styles, while emotional cutoff is related to avoidant and 
dismissing attachment styles (Skowron & Dendy, 2004).  
 As dispositional responses to interpersonal conflict, both emotional reactivity and 
emotional cutoff are viewed as harmful to the development of intimacy and autonomy 
(Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). Emotional reactivity is related to the chronic anxiety and 
worry associated with a preoccupied attachment style, and reflects the habitual tendency 
towards active and aggressive responses to relational conflict (Skowron & Dendy, 2004).  
Emotional cutoff was modified from the cross-generational concept of differentiation to 
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reflect habitual tendencies towards avoidant, passive, and passive-aggressive behaviors 
which hinder both intimacy and autonomy formation (Skowron & Dendy, 2004). Both 
emotional reactivity and emotional cutoff are methods of self-regulation implemented 
when an insecurely attached individual faces relational conflict. 
 Perfect self-differentiation is rightly considered an unattainable ideal, as the 
degree to which an individual distinguishes between thinking and feeling processes varies 
based on a multitude of factors (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). However, enhancing self-
differentiation nestles comfortably within the ideological parameters of counseling. 
Underlying issues of intimacy and autonomy are often key components in 
conceptualizing cases and developing therapeutic goals, even though they are usually not 
brought forth directly as a presenting concern by clients. The concepts are highly 
inclusive, representing a broad array of situational factors while simultaneously distilling 
the foundational patterns to which many interpersonal problems may be attributed. 
Incorporating a dual process approach to attachment through the concept of self-
differentiation can provide counselors with extremely relevant information about how 
habitual client dispositional tendencies negatively impact their pursuit of intimacy and 
autonomy. 
Empathic Orientation: Cognitive  
& Emotional Processes  
 
 The question of how best to define the concept of empathy has resulted in 
considerable debate over the last forty years, with theorists historically emphasizing 
cognitive aspects (e.g., Hogan, 1969), affective aspects (e.g., Stotland, 1969), or some 
combination therein (e.g., Davis, 1980; Smith, 2006) when building empathy models. 
While it is widely agreed that empathy involves some process of understanding and being 
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sensitive to the mental and emotional state of others, there is widespread disagreement as 
to how this system operates (Smith, 2006). Cognitive empathy is regarded by many as 
synonymous with perspective taking (Davis, 1996), although there is little agreement on 
the process by which such a cognitive phenomenon occurs. Affective empathy is 
generally considered a vital aspect of both infant and adult attachment (Vreek & van der 
Mark, 2003), while both behavioral and neurological observations point to an affective 
empathic response in animals ranging from dolphins to rats (Preston & de Waal, 2002).  
 The integrative dual process model of empathy suggests that seven distinct 
models have been developed in the literature to explain how cognitive and affective 
empathy interact to balance selfish and altruistic behaviors (Smith, 2006). The integrative 
model simply outlines how each can be understood from a dual processing approach to 
empathy. According to this integrative model, separate but complementary cognitive and 
affective empathy systems should provide an evolutionarily adaptive advantage in the 
complex world of human interactions (Smith, 2006). It also provides a spectrum-style 
framework for conceptualizing individual differences based on the degree of integration 
between cognitive and emotional empathy systems, The 2x2 model includes cognitive 
empathy deficit (low cognitive empathy, high emotional empathy), emotional empathy 
deficit (low emotional empathy, high cognitive empathy), general empathy deficit (low 
cognitive empathy, low emotional empathy), and general empathy surfeit (high cognitive 
empathy, high emotional empathy). 
 Other researchers are actively addressing this line of thought, developing new 
models which integrate cognitive and affective neuroscientific views of empathy (Boston, 
2007). In particular, the social-cognitive simulation theory of empathy distinguishes 
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between experiential and propositional modes of empathy that parallel dual-processing 
frameworks and build upon recent advances in neuropsychology (Rameson & Lieberman, 
2009). The experiential mode includes affective as well as cognitive components and 
“can be thought of as an automatic, affective, stream-of-consciousness experience that 
feels like unmediated reality” (p. 101), while the propositional mode is strictly cognitive 
insofar as it involves metacognitive evaluations and controlled reasoning (Rameson & 
Lieberman, 2009). In line with simulation theories of empathy, both experiential and 
propositional modes denote a process of “putting yourself in another’s shoes” (Baron-
Cohen, 1995), or “seeing with the eyes of another, listening with the ears of another, and 
feeling with the heart of another” (Adler, 1928). It suggests that empathic simulations are 
a necessary precondition for effective interpersonal socialization, behavioral prediction, 
and motivational explanation (Gordon, 1995). 
 The differential outcomes of experiential and propositional empathy result from 
the specific functional capacities of their respective dual-processing systems. Arising 
from the experiential system, emotional empathy involves attuned responsiveness in a 
feeling of connectedness with others (Smith, 2006), or the activation of embodied 
emotional states that somatically represent the perceived experience of another (Preston 
& de Waal, 2002). Within the analytic system, cognitive empathy involves the insight-
oriented capacity of perspective-taking (Mooradian, Davis, & Matzler, 2011), or the 
activation of mental representations that signify a metacognitive attunement to the 
mental-perceptual or subjective motivational experience of others (Preston & de Waal, 
2002). Neuroimaging studies have implicated mirror neurons in both empathic processes, 
as primarily activated in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Rameson & Lieberman, 
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2009). A functional divide in this area of the brain indicates that the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex may play an important role in emotional empathy and the dorsal region 
may relate to cognitive empathy (Stuss & Levine, 2002).  
 Avoiding any etiological or interpretive projections, the usefulness of such a 
framework for counseling is evident. The functional utility of empathy in interpersonal 
relationships has been well-established, not only as an important part of the therapeutic 
alliance (Wampold, 2001) but as a positively contributing factor in the general human 
ability to cultivate and maintain healthy relationships (Long & Andrews, 1990). A 
counselor equipped with knowledge of such dispositional tendencies can more effectively 
conceptualize, address and develop treatment plans based on a client's patterns of 
empathic responsiveness both within the therapeutic relationship and outside of it. 
Additionally, a 2x2 model of social-cognitive empathy has been proposed that could have 
implications for counseling practice and research.  
Introspective Orientation: Reflective  
& Ruminative Processes 
 
 Objective Self-Awareness Theory (OSA; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) originated as 
a framework to describe state-based situational variances in self-focused attention as a 
component of self-reflexive consciousness (Silvia & Duval, 2001; Silvia, Eichstadt & 
Phillips, 2005). The theory holds that attention directed toward the self results in both 
conscious awareness of the self and an evaluative process of comparing the self against 
standards (Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Silvia & Phillips, 2013). This objective form of self-
awareness is to be contrasted with a subjective form, described in terms of the organism's 
direct and undifferentiated engagement in behavior and perception (Silvia & Duval, 
2001). It should be noted that this distinction between objective and subjective forms of 
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self-awareness does not represent a form of attentional duality since OSA assumes that 
attention can either be directed internally (i.e. objective self-awareness) or externally (i.e. 
subjective self-awareness) at any given time. OSA maintains that attention is a singular 
phenomenon without any identifiable qualities, characteristics, or types. 
 In response to OSA, Fenigstein, Scheier and Buss (1975) designed the self-
consciousness scale to measure trait-based dispositional variances in self-focused 
attention. Three distinct categories emerged in the process, two of which have become the 
foundation for a large body of empirical and theoretical research since that time: public 
and private self-consciousness. Akin to OSA, self-consciousness theory (SCT) proposed 
that self-focused attention can be either internally or externally directed (Creed & Funder, 
1999; Fenigstein, 1987). Yet the content of this internal-external distinction is 
fundamentally different from OSA, as public self-consciousness represents self-focused 
attention in the form of an external self perceived by others (e.g. the way one walks, the 
clothes one wears, etc.) whereas private self-consciousness represents self-focused 
attention in the form of an internal self others cannot perceive (e.g. personal thoughts, 
beliefs, feelings, etc.). A guiding assumption of SCT is that these are distinct types of 
self-directed attention. 
 Proponents of OSA later contended that distinguishing types or qualities of self-
focused attention is conceptually incoherent because attention is “a contentless concept, 
without characterizable qualities” (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987, p. 499). It has also been 
claimed that the self-consciousness scale utilizes an atheoretical, factor analytic-based 
approach that disregards the dynamic cognitive and motivational processes guiding self-
awareness by passing descriptive categorical membership off as an explanation for self-
61 
 
 
 
consciousness (Wicklund & Gollwitzer, 1987). It has been well argued that the 
advantages of such categorical reductionism for empirical research - particularly those 
derived from factor analytic methodologies - are quickly offset when construct validity 
issues later arise that call entire lines of research into question (J. Block, 1995; Boyle, 
2008). The public and private subscales derived from SCT have been widely used in 
research despite pressing concerns over construct validity issues stemming from 
motivational confounds in both.  
 In a meta-analysis relating self-focused attention to negative affect, Mor and 
Winquist (2002) cite Ingram's (1990) definition of self-focus as “an awareness of self-
referent, internally generated information that stands in contrast to an awareness of 
externally generated information derived through sensory receptors” (p. 156). This clearly 
aligns with OSA's conceptualization of objective and subjective self-awareness as a 
unitary construct, and contrasts with the public and private forms of attention set forth in 
SCT. As such, researchers called for new public and private measures to be developed 
due to validity and reliability problems in the self-consciousness scale (Mor & Winquist, 
2002). While the public scale has fallen into particular disfavor (Chang, 1998; Silvia & 
Duval, 2001; Silvia, Eichstaedt, & Phillips, 2005), the private scale was subsequently 
modified or otherwise adapted across multiple models to account for motivation as a 
possible component of self-focus (Anderson, Bohon, & Berrigan, 1998; Creed & Funder, 
1998; Watson, Morris, Ramsey, Hickman, & Waddell, 1998). 
 One such modified version claimed that the self-absorption paradox (i.e., 
heightened self-focus results in both enhanced self-knowledge and psychological 
maladjustment) found in empirical results of the private self-consciousness scale is 
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attributable to its measuring two different factors: reflection and rumination (Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999). In modifying the theoretical standing of SCT, both the reflection-
rumination model of private self-consciousness and the corresponding Reflection-
Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ) posit an attention x motivation framework (Trapnell 
and Campbell, 1999). Therein, reflection is defined as “self-attentiveness motivated by 
curiosity or epistemic interest in the self” and rumination as “self-attentiveness motivated 
by perceived threats, losses, or injustices to self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999; p. 297).  
 The reflection-rumination model maintains that high levels of reflection or 
rumination are indicative of habitual self-focused attention patterns. Epistemic curiosity 
signifies the approach-oriented exploratory features of reflection while threat avoidance 
denotes the compulsive features of chronic ruminative thought (Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999). The positive-negative valence respectively attributed to reflection and rumination 
is also consistently applied in the context of non-emotionality for the former and chronic 
symptomology for the latter (Deyo, Wilson, Ong, & Koopman, 2009; Takano & Tanno, 
2009; Watkins, 2008). Similarly, reflection is widely touted as an adaptive capacity of 
cognitive foresight (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010; Williams, 2008) whereas rumination 
is typically related to maladaptive strategies and neurotic features (Ciesla, 2005; Ito & 
Agari, 2003; Lyubomirsky, Tucker, Caldwell, & Berg, 1999).  
 It has also been suggested that the reflection/rumination distinction might be 
particularly relevant in light of the coping and adjustment literature, bringing approach 
and avoidance styles of cognition into a 2x2 model with implications for counseling 
practice as well as research (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The four dispositional styles of 
introspective cognition that result from this model include sensitizing (high reflection, 
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high rumination), repressive (low reflection, low rumination), vulnerable (low reflection, 
high rumination), and adaptable (high reflection, low rumination). Counselors equipped 
with information on such processes gain insight into how client presenting symptoms and 
concerns are fueled by habitual patterns of coping and problem solving.  
Summary Statement 
 The orientation model is designed to provide counselors with a means to assess 
client dispositional tendencies related to cognitive processing, attachment, empathic 
awareness, and introspection. Conceptualized within a dual process theory framework 
and incorporating empirically-validated psychological measures, it is proposed that the 
model can be used to determine individual client variations along a rational-intuitive 
processing spectrum. As a supplement to clinical judgment and traditional assessments, 
the orientation model is meant to enhance case conceptualization practices by providing 
information that contextualizes the presenting concerns of clients and the observations of 
counselors. It supports therapeutic interventions by assessing for important dispositional 
variables that directly contribute to both interpersonal and intrapersonal instability.  
 Additionally, the orientation model aligns with the guiding philosophies of 
humanistic and existential counseling. Operating in tandem with the existential notion of 
the Lebenswelt, it frames dispositional dual-processing patterns as the situated lens 
through which clients interpret their personal experiences (Wilkinson, 2015). Client 
worldviews are understood to mediate how personal experiences are interpreted, which in 
turn influences those client thoughts, feelings, and behaviors manifest as presenting 
concerns and symptoms in counseling. Each of the orientation model constructs address a 
particular aspect of the client worldview that may serve to either protect individuals from, 
64 
 
 
 
or expose them to, adverse states of being in the world. Integrating the orientation model 
with a humanistic or existential approach can thus provide those counselors with insight 
into how certain habitual dual-processing patterns and cognitive predispositions tend to 
influence client interpretations of experience. 
 Counselors are trained to develop case conceptualizations and treatment plans 
using a combination of client self-reports, observational evidence, and clinical judgment. 
This process requires that counselors formulate calculated interpretations that blend both 
inductive and deductive elements (Falvey, 2001). As an assessment tool for case 
conceptualization purposes, the orientation model is intended to supplement this process 
of clinical interpretation by contributing empirical data from established psychological 
measures that can inform the therapeutic decision-making process. While each of the 
individual measures used have been empirically-validated, their supplemental roles 
within the conceptual framework of the orientation model have not been validated. This 
study was therefore designed to validate the hypothesized relationship among the four 
constructs and associated measures as implemented within the orientation model. 
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CHAPTER III 
METHODS 
 The research methodology for this study is outlined and discussed in this chapter. 
It describes the research questions, hypotheses, participants, measures, procedures, and 
data analyses that were used in the study.  This study investigated whether four distinct 
psychological constructs could be conceptually unified to develop a counseling 
assessment for case conceptualization and treatment planning purposes. Testing four 
instruments that assess distinct psychological constructs, it was hypothesized that both 
the direction and the magnitude of relationships among the instrument variables would be 
explained using a dual-process theory framework. A non-experimental survey design 
using convenience sampling and four self-report measures was employed to examine the 
research questions and test the stated hypotheses. 
Participants 
 Participants were undergraduate students enrolled in various sections of a first-
year seminar course at a medium-sized, Midwestern four-year research university. Based 
on aggregate course statistics, all students enrolled in the first-year seminar course were 
first-year, first-time college students (N = 452) and identified as 76% Caucasian, 17.9% 
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Hispanic, 3.3% Asian, and 2.8% African American. In addition, 66% of participants were 
female and 44% were first generation college students.  
 Inclusion in the research study was restricted to participants 18 or older, and no 
additional criteria for inclusion or exclusion was employed. An a priori power analysis 
for multivariate analysis comparing three different groups based on six outcome variables 
(α = .05, 1-β = .95, f2 = .12) indicated a minimum sample size of N = 114 to protect 
against inflated type I error. This approximates the a priori sample size requirement to 
conduct the correlation analyses within this study (α = .05, 1-β = .95, r = .3, N = 111) and 
was therefore used as the minimum standard for participant recruitment. 
 There is a long history of debate regarding the use of undergraduate participants 
in social science research (Lynch, 1982; Peterson, 2001; Wells, 1993). However, it has 
also been well argued that empirical studies designed for theory generalization rather than 
outcomes-based applications are appropriate to use with undergraduate populations since 
theorized models must go through a rigorous falsification process before being applied in 
support of real-world interventions (Calder, Phillips, & Tybout, 1981; Cacioppo et al., 
1996). A similar viewpoint arises based on the etic perspective employed across the social 
sciences to determine universal human trends in behaviors, personalities, and beliefs 
(Cheung, van de Vijver, & Leong, 2011). In terms of dispositional studies more 
specifically, personality and social psychology researchers often extrapolate the results of 
individual differences studies and trait-based psychometric assessments to heterogeneous 
adult populations based on the etic perspective (McCrae & Allik, 2002; Rust & 
Golombrok, 2014). As this study was designed for theory generalization stemming from 
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the use of individual differences measures, the researcher maintained that use of 
undergraduate participants to validate the orientation model was warranted. 
Variables 
Variables in the proposed model included: (a) rational-cognitive processing,  
(b) experiential-cognitive processing, (c) emotional cutoff, (d) emotional reactivity,  
(e) cognitive empathy, (f) emotional empathy, (g) reflection, and (h) rumination. The 
dependent (response) variables included rational-cognitive processing and experiential-
cognitive processing. The independent (predictor) variables included emotional cutoff, 
emotional reactivity, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, reflection, and rumination. 
Stemming from the tenets of the cognitive-experiential theory of dual-processing 
(Epstein, 2014), it was proposed that positive relationships would exist between rational-
cognitive processing, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflection, as well as 
between experiential-cognitive processing, emotional reactivity, emotional empathy, and 
rumination (Wilkinson, 2015; see Table 1).  
 
Table 1 
Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Relationships among Subscales 
Analytic Variables Experiential Variables 
Rational-Cognitive Processing 
Emotional Cutoff/Attachment Avoidance 
Cognitive Empathy 
Reflective Introspection 
Experiential-Cognitive Processing 
Emotional Reactivity/Attachment Anxiety 
Emotional Empathy 
Ruminative Introspection 
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 Both rational-cognitive processing and experiential-cognitive processing were 
measured using the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) designed 
to assess subject self-perception of dispositional tendencies and general identification 
with analytic and intuitive dual-processing systems. Both emotional cutoff and emotional 
reactivity were measured using the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R; 
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), designed to assess subject self-perception of dispositional 
tendencies related to emotional responsiveness in close personal relationships. Both 
cognitive empathy and emotional empathy were measured using the Interpersonal 
Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), designed to assess participant self-perception of 
dispositional empathic tendencies and conditions of interpersonal awareness. Both 
reflection and rumination were measured using the Reflection and Rumination 
Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999), designed to assess participant self-
perception of dispositional self-focused attention as a function of either intellectual 
curiosity or chronic anxiety. 
Research Questions 
Q1  Is there a linear relationship between the cognitive orientation subscales 
(as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation subscales (as 
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation subscales (as measured 
by the IRI), or the introspective orientation subscales (as measured by the 
RRQ)? 
 
H1a  No significant relationship will exist between cognitive orientation 
subscales. 
 
H1b A significant positive relationship will exist for attachment orientation 
subscales. 
 
H1c A significant positive relationship will exist for empathic orientation 
subscales. 
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H1d No significant relationship will exist between introspective orientation 
subscales. 
 
Q2  Is there a relationship between analytic process subscales and experiential 
process subscales as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the 
REI, DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ? 
 
H2a Positive relationships will exist across the four analytic process subscales. 
H2b Positive relationships will exist across the four experiential process 
subscales. 
 
Q3  How do attachment avoidance and attachment anxiety, as measured by the 
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high 
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale 
of the REI? 
 
H3a For attachment avoidance scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
H3b For attachment anxiety in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean will be 
larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, which 
will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
Q4  How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the 
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) 
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the 
REI? 
 
H4a For cognitive empathy scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the mean 
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, 
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
H4b For emotional empathy scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean 
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, 
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
Q5  How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured 
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and 
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition 
subscale of the REI? 
 
H5a For reflective introspection scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
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H5b For ruminative introspection scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
Instruments 
 Insofar as psychological models typically incorporate a hypothesis-driven, 
theoretical foundation within which the model is grounded, static and atheoretical 
accounts of dispositional personality do not provide strong working models of individual 
psychological experience for clinical use (J. Block, 1995; Boyle, 2008; Cervone, 2005). 
Lack of such a structure might explain why such measures do not translate into solid 
frameworks for clinical use (Boyle, 2008; Epstein, 2010). In light of this possibility, a 
distinction should be made here between individual-difference measures seen in the 
personality literature and those found in other areas of counseling and psychology. The 
personality approach to measurement is most often exploratory factor analytic and 
variable-center focused, using an inter-individual, population variation format to develop 
categories and constructs from a large set of variables which portend to hold both 
descriptive and explanatory power (J. Block, 1995; Cervone, 2005). With historical and 
motivational nuances excluded, the uniqueness of the person is largely removed from the 
equation and replaced with broadly comparative, static behavioral definitions that are 
difficult to translate into subjective experiential terms (J. Block, 1995; Boyle, 2008).  
 Individual difference measures within other arenas of the counseling and 
psychology literature, however, are generally set within a model-based theoretical 
framework and strive to both examine and delineate well-defined intra-individual 
psychological phenomena via confirmatory factor analysis (Epstein, 2010). In terms of 
applicability for counseling, measures of this sort have a great deal to offer. Framing such 
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measures within associated models provides a theoretical context for the definitional 
parameters used (J. Block, 1995), thereby enhancing their functional utility in case 
conceptualizations. Absent the context of a theoretical model, we are left to interpret the 
results of a measure in a fairly arbitrary manner, thereby reducing its functional utility 
and subsequent usefulness in the counseling setting. Confirmatory factor analytic (CFA) 
measures of intra-individual differences carry a great deal more descriptive power 
because they are rooted in established theoretical frameworks which provide a solid 
foundation for real world applicability, the interpretation of maladaptive behaviors, and 
case conceptualization as a result. Each of the following measures was developed using 
CFA. Permission has been granted from the authors of the instruments for their use. 
Rational-Experiential Inventory 
 The Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) was designed to 
assess individual differences in the habitual use of rational and experiential cognitions as 
a function of dual-processing capacities. It combines a modified version of the Need for 
Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982) with a new experiential measure called 
the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale. While a more recent version of the REI includes 
additional sub-dimensions for both the NFC scale and the FI scale (Pacini & Epstein, 
1999), the original rational-experiential structure of the REI fulfill the purposes set forth 
in the orientation model. The REI includes two primary long forms (REI-59, Epstein et 
al., 1996; REI-40 Norris, Pacini & Epstein, 1998), and a 10-item short form version 
(REI-SF, Epstein et al., 1996).  
 The REI-SF was used for this study and includes 10 items on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from not very true of me to very true of me. (Epstein et al., 1996). The NFC 
72 
 
 
 
subscale includes five items such as “I prefer to challenge my thinking abilities rather 
than do things that require little thought” and “I prefer complex problems to simple 
problems.” The FI subscale includes five items such as “I believe in trusting my hunches” 
and “I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I 
know.” Higher scores for either subscale indicate an increased level of self-perceived 
dispositional use of, and identification with, the identified cognitive processing capacity.  
 The original 34-item NFC was developed using a nonclinical sample of 419 
undergraduate college students and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha value of .87. A follow-up 
study using a sample of 527 undergraduate college students (Petty, Cacioppo, & Kao, 
1984) indicated that NFC scale reliability attained an asymptote with the 18 highest 
factor loading items, resulting in a new short-form version that correlated with the 
original scale (r = .95, p < .001) and had a higher Cronbach’s alpha value of .90. The five 
highest factor loading items of the NFC-SF were included in the REI-SF (Epstein et al., 
1996), which correlated strongly with the original (r = .90, p < .001) and had a 
Cronbach’s alpha value of .73. Using the Spearman-Brown prophesy formula, it is 
suggested that the internal reliability would be .91 were the short form scales expanded to 
include the same number of items used in the original NFC-SF (Epstein, 2014). The five-
item version of the NFC-SF as adapted for use in the REI-SF was used for this study. 
 The FI was developed as a counterpart to the NFC, based on the tenets of dual 
process theories, to ascertain whether measures of experiential-cognitive processing 
might be inversely related to measures of rational-cognitive processing (Epstein, 2014). 
The original 12-item FI was tested on a nonclinical sample of 184 undergraduate college 
students and yielded a Cronbach’s alpha of .77 and inter-item correlations of .23 (Epstein 
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et al., 1996). The five FI items designated as having the highest factor loading and item-
total correlations were subsequently used in the REI-SF, with a strong correlation to the 
original FI scale (r = .85, p < .001) and a Cronbach’s alpha value of .72 (Epstein et al., 
1996). The five-item version of the FI as adapted for the REI-SF was used in this study. 
  Subsequent reliability and validity research on the REI have largely confirmed the 
original results; however, no follow-up studies have been conducted on the REI-SF. 
Pacini and Epstein (1998) reported a Cronbach’s alpha values of .87 for the composite 
REI in a study with 399 undergraduate college students. In more recent research, 
Björklund and Bäckström (2008) reported a Cronbach’s alpha of .88 for the composite 
REI, found support for its factor structure using both confirmatory and exploratory factor 
analysis, and reported discriminant and concurrent validity based on correlations with 
other measures. Another more recent study provided evidence for the divergent and 
convergent validity of the REI, and also reported Cronbach’s alphas for the NFC and FI 
scales of .88 and .86, respectively (Witteman, van den Bercken, Claes, & Godoy, 2009).  
Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised  
 Skowron & Schmitt’s (2003) Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R) 
was designed as a multidimensional approach to gauging individual differences in four 
areas of interpersonal attachment. In modifying Bowen’s original formulation to include 
these more distinctive and well-defined sub-dimensions, The DSI-R delineates two 
interpsychic (fusion with others and emotional cutoff) from two intrapsychic (I-position 
and emotional reactivity) functions of attachment experience. For the orientation 
measure, only the intrapsychic variable of emotional reactivity (ER) and the interpsychic 
variable of emotional cutoff (EC) function are utilized. The DSI measures includes an 
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original 43-item long form (Skowron & Friedlander, 1998), the revised 46-item long 
form (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), and a nine-item short form (Drake, Murdock, 
Marszalek, & Barber, 2015).  
 The DSI-SF was used for this study and includes nine items on a five-point Likert 
scale ranging from not very true of me to very true of me (Drake et al.,, 2015). The EC 
subscale includes three items such as “I tend to distance myself when people get too close 
to me” and “When one of my relationships becomes very intense, I feel the urge to run 
away from it.” The ER subscale includes six items such as “At times my feelings get the 
best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly” and “If someone is upset with me, I can’t 
seem to let it go easily.” Higher scores for the subscales indicate an increased level of 
self-perceived dispositional use of, and identification with, either an avoidant (EC) or 
anxious (ER) attachment style.  
 The 46-item DSI-R was developed using a snowball sampling method that 
included the use of social media and family-oriented internet websites to accrue 225 adult 
participants and yield a Cronbach’s alpha values of .92 for the composite scale, .84 for 
the EC subscale, and .89 for the ER subscale (Skowron & Schmitt, 2003). Reliability and 
validity research on the DSI-R has demonstrated good internal reliability, with one study 
reporting a Cronbach’s alpha of .84 for the composite scale (Knauth & Skowron, 2004), 
and another reporting Cronbach’s alphas of .89 for the composite DSI-R, .82 for the EC 
subscale, and .88 for the ER subscale (Jankowski & Hooper, 2012). The latter study also 
reported convergent and discriminant validity for the DSI-R based on correlations with 
other measures of similar theoretical relevance (Jankoswski & Hooper). 
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 In developing the DSI-SF (Drake et al.,, 2015) a Graded Response Model (GRM) 
was used to determine appropriate item parameters for each of the subscales, and a good 
fit was reported for three of the EC subscale items (G2[46] = 164.32, p < 0.01) and six of 
the ER subscale items (G2[136] = 131.27, p = .30). The scale was assessed using 595 
undergraduate college student and revealed a Cronbach’s alpha value of .79 for the three-
item EC subscale and .80 for the six-item ER subscale. Additionally, the convergent 
validity and test-retest reliability of the DSI-SF were reported. The nine-item DSI-SF was 
used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies towards attachment avoidance and 
attachment anxiety.  
Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
 Davis’ (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) was designed as a 
multidimensional approach to gauging individual differences in four different forms of 
empathy: perspective-taking, empathic concern, personal distress, and fantasy 
transposition. For the purposes of the orientation model only two of the four are used 
since the sub-measures of perspective-taking (IRI-C) and empathic concern (IRI-E) are 
respectively taken to represent cognitive and affective dual-processing experiences of 
empathy. The cognitive perspective-taking subscale represents an ability to mentally take 
the viewpoint of other people while the emotional empathic concern subscale signifies 
feelings of concern for other people (Davis, 1980). The IRI-C and IRI-E subscales were 
therefore used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies in the use of cognitive 
empathy and emotional empathy. 
 The IRI consists of 28 items measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from 
does not describe me very well to described me very well. The IRI-C subscale includes 
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seven items such as “I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how 
things look from their perspective” and “When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put 
myself in their shoes’ for a while.” The IRI-E subscale consists of seven items such as “I 
often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me” and “I would 
describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person.” Higher scores for either subscales 
indicates an increased level of self-perceived dispositional use of, and identification with, 
cognitively-oriented empathic dual processing or affectively-oriented empathic dual-
processing. 
 The 28-item IRI was developed using a nonclinical sample of 158 undergraduate 
college students and yielded Cronbach’s alphas of .78 for the composite instrument, .79 
for the IRI-C subscale, and .80 for the IRI-E subscale (Davis, 1980). Numerous reliability 
and validity studies on the IRI have been conducted with similar results. Applied to a 
sample of 432 undergraduate students in Chile, researchers reported a Cronbach’s alpha 
of .73 for both the IRI-C and IRI-E subscale, as well as evidence for test-retest reliability, 
structural validity, and predictive validity of the composite IRI (Fernandez, Dufey, & 
Kramp, 2011). In cross-cultural research sampling from 641 Dutch adults, De Corte et al. 
(2007) reported Cronbach’s alphas of .73 for the IRI-C subscale and .73 for the IRI-E 
subscale, as well as evidence for construct validity, convergent validity, and discriminant 
validity. A French study using a nonclinical sample of 322 adults reported Cronbach’s 
alphas of .71 for the IRI-C subscale, .70 for the IRI-E subscale, and good test-retest 
reliability over a twelve month period (Gilet, Mella, Studer, Grühn, & Labouvie-Vief, 
2013). 
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Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire 
 The Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) 
was designed to distinguish between adaptive and maladaptive dimensions of self-
focused attention. It also served to explain how the self-absorption paradox (i.e., 
heightened self-focus results in both enhanced self-knowledge and psychological 
maladjustment) arising from results in the private self-consciousness scale (Fenigstein, 
Scheier, & Buss, 1975) is attributable to the measurement of two distinct cognitive 
variables: reflection and rumination. The RRQ assesses for individual differences in these 
self-focused attention styles, whereby reflection signifies an introspective tendency that is 
motivated by intellectual curiosity while rumination is repetitive or chronic and 
motivated by “perceived threats, losses, or injustices to the self” (Trapnell & Campbell, 
1999, p. 297). The reflection and rumination subscales of the 14-item RRQ short form 
was used for this study to assess dispositional tendencies towards cognitive introspection 
and emotional introspection. 
 The RRQ includes a 24-item version as well as a 14-item short-form, and both are 
measured on a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. 
The short-form reflection subscale consists of seven items such as “It is easy for me to 
put unwanted thoughts out of my mind” and “I love to meditate on the nature and 
meaning of things.” The short-form rumination subscale includes seven items such as “I 
often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with” and 
“Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself.” Higher scores for either 
subscale indicate an increased level of self-perceived dispositional use of, and 
identification with, cognitive or emotional introspective tendencies. 
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 The 24-item RRQ was developed across three studies using a combined 
nonclinical sample of 1,137 undergraduate college students, and reported Cronbach’s 
alphas of .91 for the reflection subscale and .90 for the rumination subscale. Despite the 
relatively frequent use of the RRQ in empirical studies, few reliability and validity 
studies have been conducted. Uttl, Morin, and Hamper (2011) reported a Cronbach’s 
alpha of .89 for the reflection subscale and .87 for the rumination subscale in a sample of 
380 undergraduate college students. For the development of a Japanese-version of the 
RRQ, internal consistency and concurrent validity were evidenced among a sample of 
241 undergraduate students, with a Cronbach’s alpha of .89 for the reflection subscale 
and .88 for the rumination subscale (Takano & Tanno, 2009).  
Procedures 
 Exempt status by the university’s institutional review board (IRB) was approved 
for this study (Appendix I). Upon receiving IRB approval, participants were recruited 
from 19 sections of a first-year seminar course (N = 452). Access to this population was 
granted by the first-year seminar program director, who agreed to allow the survey to be 
uploaded onto all UNC-registered student Blackboard accounts 
(http://unco.blackboard.com) for the course using a designated, master webpage 
controlled by the program director. All students who participated in the first-year seminar 
utilized a course-specific Blackboard webpage, and the designated survey web-link was 
posted on that webpage for all first-year seminar students to access. The researcher 
posted a formal message (Appendix G) on the “Announcement” page of all first-year 
seminar students about the opportunity to complete the survey.  
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 The researcher also sent this formal message out as a bulk email invitation to first-
year seminar students using the master webpage bulk email database, with permission for 
access provided by the program director. Individual student information was protected in 
this process, as a single email was automatically sent to all potential participants in the 
first-year seminar course using a bulk emailing procedures. One follow-up bulk email 
invitations (Appendix H) was distributed eight days later to remind potential participants 
of the survey opportunity, during which time the survey remained openly accessible on 
the first-year seminar course Blackboard page. Although data on the total number of 
individual that accessed the survey was tallied by the Qualtrics survey software program, 
no identifying information for non-participants was accessible to either the researcher or 
the program director.  
 All participants were informed of the purpose of the study and that participation 
would be entirely voluntary. The measures (Appendices B, C, D, E) and the basic 
demographics questionnaire (Appendix F) were administered using a university-
registered Qualtrics account (http://unco.qualtrics.com) established by the researcher. The 
informed consent to participate in research (Appendix A) was included on the first page 
of the online survey (Qualtrics – http://unco.qualtrics.com).  The informed consent let 
participants know that choosing to continue in the survey by clicking “Start” implied both 
consent and that they attested to the fact that they were 18 years of age or older. 
  Information about the random drawing for two $50.00 Amazon.com gift cards 
was provided on the second page of the online survey. Participants were required to 
complete all survey items in order to enter the prize drawing pool. Participants were also 
required to provide their first-year seminar course section number and the last four digits 
80 
 
 
 
of their university-registered Personal Digital Identity (PDID). All course section 
numbers were provided in a drop-down list and a numerical text box was provided for 
PDID four-digit numerical entries. The following statement was included on the second 
page of the survey to clarify participant entry requirements:  
 If you wish to enter the random prize drawing to win one of two possible $50.00 
Amazon.com gift cards, additional personal information is required so that a 
winner can be contacted. Please select your first-year seminar course section 
number and enter the last four digits of your official university PDID. If you do 
not want to participate in the prize drawing, please click on the box below labeled 
“No, I do not wish to participate in the random prize drawing”. All questions in 
this survey must be completed in order to enter the random prize drawing. Thank 
you for your participation. 
 
The next five pages of the online survey included the researcher-developed demographics 
questionnaire and four instruments. The demographics questionnaire included entries for 
age, gender, and race/ethnicity (Appendix F). The four instruments included the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (REI; 10 Likert-type items), the Differentiation of Self Inventory-
Revised (DSI-R; 9 Likert-type items), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI, 14 Likert-
type items), and the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ; 14 Likert-type items).  
 The researcher maintains that this study presented no additional risks beyond 
those typically associated with traditional surveys administered in academic and 
university settings. Study analyses did not investigate individual survey responses, but 
rather analyzed the data in aggregate. Participant names were not be used in any stage of 
the data collection process. Student PDID and course section number information 
provided to enter the random prize drawing were separated from all other data in a 
designated Excel spreadsheet to ensure participant confidentiality. Numeric identifiers 
were then randomly assigned to each completed survey following data collection in order 
to maintain both organization in the data entry process and participant confidentiality in 
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the data analysis process. Additional procedures were instituted to ensure that student 
data were kept confidential and secure. The online Qualtrics account in which survey 
responses were collected was both encrypted and password-protected. Survey data were 
entered into a password-protected computer file and securely stored on a university 
computer in the researcher’s locked office on campus. This data file was also saved in an 
encrypted drive that was only accessible to the researcher.  
Data Analysis 
 Following data collection, surveys were scored using the appropriate procedures 
for each instrument. All demographic information and instrument data were organized 
using an Excel spreadsheet and subsequently entered into SPSS version 22 for statistical 
analysis. The data were then analyzed for descriptive statistics such as means, standard 
deviations, and skewness for the four composite instruments as well as the eight 
subscales. Internal consistency estimates were calculated for each composite to assess 
reliability. The data were also assessed for violations of multivariate analysis assumptions 
and for missing values. 
 To address the first research question, bivariate correlation analyses were 
conducted to determine the degree and direction of relationships among subscales within 
each of the four composite instruments. To address the second research question, a 
canonical correlation analysis was conducted to determine the direction and magnitude of 
relationships between the predictor variables and the outcome variables. Since the second 
research question addressed the strength or degree of association between analytic and 
experiential constructs as latent variables within the model, a canonical correlation 
analysis was preferred over the use of a regression analysis of independent variables. By 
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comparing weighted sums of the two variable sets, the hypothesized linear combination 
of analytic and experiential subscales could be established as a correlation between the 
sets. Standardized canonical function coefficients, structure coefficients, squared 
structure coefficients, and redundancy estimates were analyzed to assess the variance of 
the original variables, and the results were reviewed for violations of normality, linearity, 
and homoscedasticity. 
 To address the remaining three research questions a factorial MANOVA was 
conducted. Participants were grouped into high, medium, and low categories based on 
percentile scores derived from the Need for Cognition (NC) and Faith in Intuition (FI) 
subscales of the REI. In order to maintain relatively equivalent group sizes and remain 
within the parameters of statistical test assumptions, about 33% of the participants were 
assigned to each respective category. A 3 (NC-REI) x 3 (FI-REI) factorial MANOVA was 
subsequently conducted on DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ composite scores. Finally, univariate 
post hoc Tukey tests were conducted to determine how the NC categories and the FI 
categories uniquely influence each of the six outcome variables across composite 
instrument scores.  
Summary 
 A non-experimental survey design was used in this study to examine whether the 
four psychological constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and 
introspection could be conceptually unified to develop a humanistic-existential 
counseling assessment for use in case conceptualization and treatment planning. Five 
hypotheses, guided by the tenets of dual process theory, were used to guide relevant 
determinations of the direction and magnitude of relationships among the instrument 
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variables. Data were collected from a sample of undergraduate college students using an 
online survey comprised of a researcher developed demographics questionnaire, a short 
form of the REI (Epstein et al., 1996), a short-form of the DSI-R (Drake et al.,, 2015; 
Skowron & Schmitt, 2003), the IRI (Davis, 1980), and a short-form of the RRQ (Trapnell 
& Campbell, 1999).  
 Data were analyzed in aggregate to address the guiding research questions and 
evaluate the hypotheses. Preliminary analyses included descriptive statistics for each of 
the variables as well as means, standard deviations, frequencies, skewness, and internal 
consistency reliability estimates. Hypothesis H1 was analyzed using bivariate correlation 
analyses. Hypothesis H2 was analyzed using canonical correlation analysis. Hypotheses 
H3, H4, and H5 were analyzed using a 3 x 3 factorial MANOVA, as well as post-hoc 
Tukey tests. In Chapter IV, the results of these analyses are described. 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS 
 This chapter presents the results of the quantitative analyses for this study. The 
first section provides information on participant demographics as well as descriptive 
statistics, multivariate normality, homogeneity of variances, and internal consistency 
estimates for the instruments. The second section presents results for the following five 
research questions. The final section provides a brief review of implications for the 
results of the study. The level of significance for all statistical analyses was α = 0.05. 
 
Q1  Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive 
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as 
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the 
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)? 
 
Q2  Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential 
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI, 
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ? 
 
Q3  How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the 
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high 
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale 
of the REI? 
 
Q4  How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the 
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) 
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the 
REI? 
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Q5  How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured 
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and 
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition 
subscale of the REI? 
 
Preliminary Analyses 
Demographic Data 
 The sample consisted of 375 college freshmen from a medium-sized, Midwestern 
four-year research university in the United States. The survey response rate was 83%. All 
participants completed a researcher developed demographics questionnaire disclosing 
age, gender, and race/ethnicity (see Table 2). All participants reported being either 18 or 
19 years of age. Participants that reported being under the age of 18 were automatically 
barred from completing the survey. Of the 375 participants, 251 reported being female 
(66.9%) and 124 reported being male (33.1%). This is comparable to the student gender 
distribution for the entire university – 63.5% female and 36.5% male – as of the fall of 
2015. Most participants were Caucasian (n = 257; 68.5%), while others reported being 
Hispanic (n = 83; 22.1%), African American (n = 20; 5.3%), Asian (n = 5; 1.3%), Native 
American or Alaskan (n = 1; 0.3%), and several participants reported as other (n = 9; 
2.4%) but did not specify their racial/ethnic identity.  
Multivariate Normality 
 Prior to hypothesis testing, the data were assessed for outliers and normality 
distributions among the scores. Multivariate normality was assessed through a close 
examination of the univariate distributions due to the inherent complexities involved in 
assessing multivariate normality distributions (Kline, 2005). Using stem-and-leaf plots, 
seventeen outliers were discovered across the eight subscales and these values were 
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subsequently transformed using the Winsorizing method – or by substituting the actual 
value for the closest normative value – as recommended by Ghosh and Vogt (2012). This 
included five outlier scores of 1.0 for the REI-FI adjusted to the next lowest score of 1.6, 
three outlier scores of 5.0 for the DSI-EC adjusted to the next highest score of 4.5, three 
outlier scores of 4.6 for the DSI-ER adjusted to the next highest score of 4.2, one outlier 
score of 5.0 for the RRQ-Rf adjusted to the next highest score of 4.7, and five outlier 
scores of 1.3 for the RRQ-Rm adjusted to the next lowest score of 1.6.   
 
Table 2 
Demographic Characteristics of the Study Sample 
             N       %  
Age Group 18-19 
 
20+ 
 
375 
 
0 
100 
 
0 
 
Gender Male 
 
Female 
 
124 
 
251 
33.1 
 
66.9 
 
Race/Ethnicity Caucasian 
 
Hispanic/Latino 
 
African American 
 
Asian 
 
Native American/Alaskan 
 
Other 
257 
 
83 
 
20 
 
5 
 
1 
 
9 
68.5 
 
22.1 
 
5.3 
 
1.3 
 
0.3 
 
2.4 
 
Note. N = 375. 
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 Subsequently analyzed histograms and box plots indicated that each of the 
variables were distributed normally around the mean. The values for both skewness and 
kurtosis were within an acceptable range for all subscales (Kline, 2005; West, Finch, & 
Curran, 1995), thus further supporting the graphical evidence for a normal distribution of 
scores (see Table 3). The absolute value of skewness for the DSI-EC proved to be highest 
among the subscales at 1.838, yet remained less than the absolute value of 2.0 as a 
moderate-level criterion (West et al., 1995). The absolute value of kurtosis for the REI-
NC proved to be the highest among the subscales at 1.648, yet remained less than the 
absolute value of 2.0 as a moderate-level criterion for normally distributed data (Garson, 
2012; Kline, 2005).  
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in the Orientation Model 
 REI-NC REI-FI DSI-EC DSI-ER IRI-C IRI-E RRQ-Rf RRQ-Rm 
 
Mean  
 
3.47 3.63 2.75 3.31 3.61 3.76 3.29 3.32 
SD 
 
.53 .50 .88 .77 .51 .54 .70 .66 
Minimum 
 
2.0 2.2 1.33 1.33 1.86 2.14 1.33 1.33 
Maximum 
 
4.8 4.8 4.66 4.83 4.86 4.86 4.83 4.88 
Range 
 
2.6 2.6 3.33 3.5 3.0 2.72 3.5 3.55 
Skewness 
 
-.017 -.036 .239 -.160 .003 .158 .150 -.027 
Kurtosis -.412 .348 -.230 -.322 .400 -.311 .059 -.078 
 
Note. N = 375. Standard error for skewness was .13 and standard error for kurtosis was 
.25 for all scales. 
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Homogeneity of Covariance Matrices 
 Despite equal sample sizes, Box’s M was assessed to establish equality of 
covariances and was found to be insignificant for all three MANOVAs and the canonical 
correlation analysis (CCA). This step was performed to ensure that the within-group 
covariance matrices were equal in accordance with the statistical assumptions required 
for both multivariate analyses of variance and canonical correlation analyses. Univariate 
homogeneity of variance was also tested for each dependent variable using Levene’s test, 
which established the equality of error variances for all three MANOVAs.  
 For research question three, error variance was F(8, 366) = 1.760, p = .084 for the 
Emotional Cutoff subscale and F(8, 366) = .780, p = .620 for the Emotional Reactivity 
subscale. For research question four, error variance was F(8, 366) = .681, p = .708 for the 
Cognitive Empathy subscale and F(8, 366) = 1.745, p = .087 for the Emotional Empathy 
subscale. For research question five, error variance was F(8, 366) = .981, p = .450 for the 
Reflection subscale and F(8, 366) = 2.289, p = .051 for the Rumination subscale. With an 
equal number of participants in each group as well as Box’s M and Levene’s test proving 
insignificant, the robustness of the MANOVAs and CCA was ensured.  
Reliability of Instruments 
 Beyond the demographic questionnaire, participants completed four self-report 
surveys to measure variables within the orientation model. These Likert-type surveys 
included measures of cognitive processing style (Rational Experiential Inventory; Epstein 
et al., 1996), attachment style (Differentiation of Self Inventory - Revised; Skowron & 
Schmitt, 2003), empathy style (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1983), and self-
focused attention style (Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire; Trapnell & Campbell, 
89 
 
 
 
1999). Internal consistency estimates of reliability were derived using Cronbach’s alpha 
scores, wherein the subscales ranged from .67 to .83 (see Table 4). 
 While the Cronbach’s alpha of .67 for the REI-NC and the REI-FI subscales is 
somewhat lower than that found in previous studies, it is certainly comparable (Epstein et 
al., 1996) and a predictable consequence of test length (Schmitt, 1996). It has also been 
argued that the Spearman-Brown prophesy formula indicates a much higher internal 
reliability were the REI short-form expanded to the length of the REI long-form (Epstein 
et al., 1996). Although any such argument does not automatically offset the potential 
problem of reliability for the subscales, the face validity of the items do indicate a 
reasonable degree of unidimensionality and content coverage within their respective 
domains (Epstein, 2014; Schmitt, 1996).  
 
Table 4 
Reliability Information 
Instrument N α 
REI-Need for Cognition subscale 
 
REI-Faith in Intuition subscale 
5 
 
5 
.674 
 
.672 
 
DSI-Emotional Cutoff subscale 
 
DSI-Emotional Reactivity subscale 
3 
 
6 
.779 
 
.812 
 
IRI-Cognitive Empathy subscale 
 
IRI-Emotional Empathy subscale 
7 
 
7 
.726 
 
.779 
 
RRQ-Reflection subscale 
 
RRQ-Rumination subscale 
6 
 
8 
.824 
 
.837 
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 As for the remaining six subscales, internal reliability estimates were well within 
the acceptable range (i.e., above .70) for use in the social sciences (Knapp & Mueller, 
2010) and were quite similar to results established across previous studies. As such, the 
current study lends additional empirical support to the established internal reliability 
estimates for the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised-Short Form (Drake et al.,, 
2015), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index subscales (Davis, 1983), and the Reflection-
Rumination Questionnaire subscales (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). 
Research Question One 
Q1  Is there a relationship between paired constructs for the cognitive 
orientation (as measured by the REI), the attachment orientation (as 
measured by the DSI-R), the empathic orientation (as measured by the 
IRI), and the introspective orientation (as measured by the RRQ)? 
 
H1a  No significant relationship will exist for cognitive orientation subscales. 
H1b A significant positive relationship will exist for attachment orientation 
subscales. 
 
H1c A significant positive relationship will exist for empathic orientation 
subscales. 
 
H1d No significant relationship will exist for introspective orientation 
subscales. 
 
 It was hypothesized that significant positive relationships would exist between 
paired constructs for the attachment orientation and the empathic orientation, while no 
significant relationships would exist between paired constructs for the cognitive 
orientation and introspective orientation. The results supported these hypotheses. The 
Need for Cognition and Faith in Intuition subscales of the REI were not significantly 
correlated (r = .047, p = .366), and neither were the reflection and rumination subscales 
of the RRQ (r = .058, p = .266). The emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity subscales 
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of the DSI-R were significantly positively correlated (r = .328, p < 0.01), as were the 
cognitive and emotional empathy subscales (r = .451, p < 0.01). A correlation matrix of 
the eight variables was analyzed and the resulting Pearson product-moment correlations 
are found in Table 5. 
 Additionally, the lack of a statistically significant correlation between the Need 
for Cognition and Faith in Intuition subscales effectively resolved potential concerns as to 
the assumption of multicollinearity in the canonical correlation analysis for research 
question two. 
 
Table 5 
Correlation Matrix for the Orientation Model Variables 
 REI-NC REI-FI DSI-EC DSI-ER IRI-C IRI-E RRQ-Rf RRQ-Rm 
REI-NC 1 .05 -.15** -.15** .31** .15** .32** -.15** 
REI-FI  1 -.10* -.11* .01 .01 .02 -.07 
DSI-EC   1 .33** -.09 -.08 -.08 .34** 
DSI-ER    1 .10* .32** .05 .62** 
IRI-C     1 .45** .39** -.09 
IRI-E      1 .33** .21** 
RRQ-Rf       1 .06 
RRQ-
Rm 
       1 
Note. N = 375. * indicates correlation is significant at p < 0.05 level. ** indicates 
correlation is significant at p < 0.01 level. Bivariate correlations assessed for research 
question 1 are bolded. 
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Research Question Two 
Q2  Is there a relationship between analytic processes and experiential 
processes as multi-operationalized in the variable sets across the REI, 
DSI-R, IRI, and RRQ? 
 
H2a Positive relationships will exist across the four analytic process subscales. 
H2b Positive relationships will exist across the four experiential process 
subscales.  
 
 A canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was conducted to determine the 
relationships among the hypothesized analytic and experiential variable sets. The CCA 
revealed three statistically significant functions with squared canonical correlations of 
.289, .162, and .030 (R2). The Wilk’s lambda for the complete model was statistically 
significant at .577, F(16, 1121.84) = 13.79, p < .001, thereby making the R2 type effect 
size approximately .42 for the full model. As such, 42% of the shared variance between 
the two sets of variables is explained by the model.  
 Function 2 to 4 was statistically significant at .81, F(9, 895.77) = 8.85, p < .001, 
explaining about 16% of the shared variance. Function 3 to 4 was also significant at .97, 
F(4, 738) = 2.82, p = .024, explaining about 3% of the shared variance. Function 4 to 4 
was statistically insignificant. Considering the R2 for each successive function, only the 
first and second functions were regarded as important indicators of underlying synthetic 
variables in the study. Standardized canonical function coefficients, structure coefficients, 
and squared structure coefficients for Function 1 and Function 2 are found in Table 6. 
 As hypothesized, the structure coefficients for each of the predictor variables were 
significantly related to Function 1, along with the unspecified inclusion of emotional 
empathy (r = -.802). The structure coefficients for all variables were negative aside from 
emotional cutoff. This aligns conceptually with the negative implications of high 
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attachment avoidance scores insofar as the orientation model predicts that high 
participant scores on need for cognition, cognitive empathy, and reflection should 
directly correspond with low attachment avoidance scores. The structure coefficients for 
three of the four criterion variables were significantly related to Function 2, along with 
the unspecified inclusion of emotional cutoff (r = -.748). Faith in Intuition was not 
significantly related to any canonical functions in the model. Within Function 2, the 
structure coefficients were negative for all hypothesized experiential variables. 
 
Table 6 
Canonical Solutions for Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Variable Sets 
  Function 1   Function 2  
Variable Coef r r2 (%) Coef r r2 (%) 
REI-NC -.100 -.455 19.80 .415 .264 6.97 
REI-FI -.031 -.108 1.17 .132 .217 4.71 
DSI-EC .451 .545 29.70 -.759 -.748 55.95 
DSI-ER .110 .149 2.22 -.679 -.938 87.98 
IRI-C -.719 -.860 73.96 -.490 -.424 17.98 
IRI-E -.948 -.802 64.32 -.273 -.537 28.84 
RRQ-Rf -.175 -.521 27.14 -.339 -.338 11.42 
RRQ-Rm .537 .409 16.73 -.253 -.743 55.21 
Note. Structure coefficients (r) greater than |.45| are bolded. Coef = standardized 
canonical function coefficient; r = structure coefficient; r2 = squared structure coefficient. 
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 The redundancy analysis within CCA indicates the strength of canonical cross 
loadings between the predictor and criterion variables. As seen in Table 7, the only 
variable with a statistically significant adequacy coefficient in the redundancy analysis 
was cognitive empathy. This stems from the relative degree of multicollinearity between 
cognitive and emotional empathy variables in conjunction with the significant 
relationship of emotional empathy to both canonical variates seen in Table 5. Otherwise, 
the redundancy analysis lends further support to the hypothesis that there is a unique 
relationship among analytic processes and among experiential processes within the 
orientation model.  
 The CCA lends some clearly interpretable support to the hypothesis that the four 
analytic process subscales are uniquely related, thereby resulting in Hypothesis 2a being 
accepted. The results for the experiential process subscales are not so clear. The exclusion 
of the faith in intuition variable from any significant findings indicates that this measure 
is not significantly related to either the hypothesized analytic or the hypothesized 
experiential variable sets. As such, Hypothesis 2b was rejected. However, there is a 
notably significant relationship among the other hypothesized experiential variables 
which, combined with the lack of significant cross loadings, indicates that there is indeed 
an overarching conceptual distinction to be drawn between the analytic and experiential 
variable sets despite the statistical insignificance of the Faith in Intuition subscale within 
the model. 
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Table 7 
Redundancy Analysis Results for Hypothesized Analytic and Experiential Variable Sets  
 Predictor Variables Set Criterion Variables Set 
 REI-NC DSI-EC IRI-C RRQ-Rf REI-FI DSI-ER IRI-E RRQRm 
V1 -.239 .293 -.462 -.280 -.058 .080 -.431 .220 
V2 .106 -.301 -.171 -.136 .087 -.378 -.216 -.299 
Note. V1 = Variate 1; V2 = Variate 2; adequacy coefficients greater than |.45| are bolded. 
 
Research Question Three 
Q3  How do attachment anxiety and attachment avoidance, as measured by the 
DSI-R, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high 
scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale 
of the REI? 
 
H3a For attachment avoidance scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
H3b For attachment anxiety in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean will be 
larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, which 
will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
 A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both 
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict 
variations in the estimated marginal means for attachment anxiety and attachment 
avoidance scores on the DSI-R, respectively. A significant difference was not found 
between need for cognition and attachment patterns (Wilk’s λ = .980, F(4, 730) = 1.859, 
p < .116), nor between faith in intuition and attachment patterns (Wilk’s λ = .982, 
F(4,730) = 1.625, p < .166).  
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 However, as seen in Table 8, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that 
need for cognition predicts attachment avoidance (F = 3.072, p < .048) but not 
attachment anxiety (F = 1.088, p = .159), while faith in intuition predicted neither 
attachment avoidance (F = .929, p = .396) nor attachment anxiety (F = 2.875, p = .058). 
A post hoc one-way Tukey test revealed that both low (p = .019) and high (p < .001) 
scores were significantly different on the Need for Cognition subscale in regard to the 
variable of emotional cutoff. Since the relationship between the Faith in Intuition 
subscale and attachment anxiety was not statistically significant, Hypothesis H3b was 
rejected. 
 
Table 8 
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and 
Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised Subscales 
 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
 
Type III SS Df F p 
REI-NC DSI-EC 
 
DSI-ER 
 
4.919 
 
2.175 
2 
 
2 
3.072 
 
1.851 
.048 
 
.159 
REI-FI DSI-EC 
 
DSI-ER 
1.421 
 
3.385 
2 
 
2 
.929 
 
2.875 
.396 
 
.058 
 
Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded. 
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Table 9 
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for 
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Need for 
Cognition 
M SE 95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
DSI-EC Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
2.884 
 
2.715 
 
2.614 
 
.079 
 
.079 
 
.081 
2.729 
 
2.559 
 
2.455 
3.040 
 
2.870 
 
2.773 
DSI-ER Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
3.398 
 
3.326 
 
3.214 
.069 
 
.069 
 
.071 
3.261 
 
3.189 
 
3.074 
3.534 
 
3.462 
 
3.353 
 
Note. N = 125; DSI-EC = Emotional Cutoff subscale; DSI-ER = Emotional Reactivity 
subscale. 
  
 The estimated marginal means (see Table 9) of the need for cognition subscale in 
relation to attachment avoidance scores indicated that means for the high scoring group 
were smaller than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had smaller means that 
the low scoring group (high: 2.614, medium: 2.715, low: 2.884), indicating that higher 
need for cognition scores correspond with lower attachment avoidance scores. Although 
categorical levels of intensity on the Need for Cognition subscale impacted self-reported 
cognitive empathy, the actual direction of influence was inverse to the predicted direction 
and therefore Hypothesis H3a was rejected. 
Research Question Four 
Q4  How do cognitive empathy and emotional empathy, as measured by the 
IRI, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) 
on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition subscale of the 
REI? 
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H4a For cognitive empathy scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the mean 
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, 
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
H4b For emotional empathy scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the mean 
will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity scores, 
which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.  
 
 A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both 
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict 
variations in the estimated marginal means for cognitive empathy and emotional empathy 
scores on the IRI. A significant difference was found between need for cognition and 
empathy patterns (Wilk’s λ = .926, F(4, 730) = 7.111, p < .001), but not between faith in 
intuition and empathy (Wilk’s λ = .998, F(4, 730) = .139, p < .968).  
 As seen in table 10, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that need for 
cognition significantly predicts both cognitive empathy (F = 14.454, p < .001) and 
emotional empathy (F = 3.488, p < .032), but faith in intuition is predictive of neither 
cognitive (F = .067, p = .935) nor emotional (F = .145, p = .865) empathy. A post hoc 
one-way Tukey test revealed that both low (p < .001) and medium (p < .001) scores were 
significantly different on the Need for Cognition subscale in relation to cognitive 
empathy. Additionally, low and high scores (p = .014) were significantly different on the 
Need for Cognition subscale for the measure of emotional empathy. Insofar as the 
relationship between the Faith in Intuition subscale and emotional empathy was not 
statistically significant, Hypothesis H4b was rejected. 
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Table 10 
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and 
Interpersonal Reactivity Index Subscales 
 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
 
Type III SS Df F p 
REI-NC IRI-C 
 
IRI-E 
 
6.864 
 
2.007 
2 
 
2 
14.454 
 
3.488 
.001 
 
.032 
REI-FI IRI-C 
 
IRI-E 
.032 
 
.083 
2 
 
2 
.067 
 
.145 
.935 
 
.865 
 
Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded. 
  
 The estimated marginal means (see Table 11) of the need for cognition subscale 
in relation to cognitive empathy scores indicated that means for the high scoring group 
were larger than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had larger means that the 
low scoring group (high: 3.793, medium: 3.583, low: 3.458). The same patterns was 
found for the Need for Cognition subscale relative to emotional empathy scores (high: 
3.858, medium: 3.735, low: 3.679), indicating that higher need for cognition scores also 
correspond with higher emotional empathy scores. Since categorical levels of intensity on 
the need for cognition subscale influenced self-reported cognitive empathy, Hypothesis 
H4a was accepted. 
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Table 11 
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for 
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Interpersonal Reactivity Index Subscales 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Need for 
Cognition 
M SE 95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
IRI-C Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
3.458 
 
3.583 
 
3.793 
.044 
 
.044 
 
.045 
3.371 
 
3.496 
 
3.704 
3.544 
 
3.669 
 
3.881 
 
IRI-E Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
3.679 
 
3.735 
 
3.858 
.048 
 
.049 
 
.049 
3.583 
 
3.639 
 
3.761 
3.774 
 
3.830 
 
3.955 
 
Note. N = 125; IRI-C = Cognitive Empathy subscale; IRI-E = Emotional Empathy 
subscale.  
 
 
Research Question Five 
Q5  How do reflective introspection and ruminative introspection, as measured 
by the RRQ, relate to categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and 
high scores) on the Need for Cognition subscale and Faith in Intuition 
subscale of the REI? 
 
H5a For reflective introspection scores in relation to Need for Cognition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores. 
 
H5b For ruminative introspection scores in relation to Faith in Intuition, the 
mean will be larger for high intensity scores than for medium intensity 
scores, which will in turn be larger than for low intensity scores.  
  
 A 3 x 3 factorial multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was conducted to 
determine whether categorical levels of intensity (low, medium, and high scores) on both 
the Need for Cognition subscale and the Faith in Intuition subscale of the REI predict 
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variations in the estimated marginal means for reflective introspection and ruminative 
introspection scores on the RRQ. A significant difference was found between need for 
cognition and introspective patterns (Wilk’s λ = .895, F(4, 730) = 10.446, p < .001), but 
not between faith in intuition and introspective patterns (Wilk’s λ = .990, F(4, 730) = 
.905, p = .460).  
 
Table 12 
Factorial Multivariate Analysis of Variance: Rational Experiential Inventory and 
Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire Subscales 
 
Source Dependent 
Variable 
 
Type III SS Df F p 
REI-NC RRQ-Reflection 
 
RRQ-Rumination 
 
15.037 
 
2.835 
2 
 
2 
16.582 
 
3.319 
.001 
 
.037 
REI-FI RRQ-Reflection 
 
RRQ-Rumination 
1.009 
 
.693 
2 
 
2 
1.113 
 
.811 
.330 
 
.445 
 
Note. N = 125; significant differences, based on p < .05, are bolded. 
  
 As seen in Table 12, the test of between subjects’ effects indicated that need for 
cognition predicts both reflection (F = 16.582, p < .001) and rumination (F = 3.319, p < 
.037), but faith in intuition is predictive of neither reflection (F = 1.113, p = .330) nor 
rumination (F = .811, p = .445) empathy. A post hoc one-way Tukey test revealed that 
both low (p < .001) and medium (p < .001) scores were significantly different on the 
Need for Cognition subscale in regard to reflective introspection. Additionally, low and 
high scores were significantly different (p = .021) on the Need for Cognition subscale for 
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the measure of ruminative introspection. Since the relationship between the Faith in 
Intuition subscale and rumination was not statistically significant, Hypothesis H5b was 
rejected. 
  
Table 13 
Estimated Marginal Means: High, Medium, and Low Scoring Groups on the Need for 
Cognition Subscale in Relation to the Reflection-Rumination Questionnaire Subscales 
 
Dependent 
Variable 
Need for 
Cognition 
M SE 95% CI 
Lower 
Bound 
95% CI 
Upper 
Bound 
RRQ-Rf Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
3.077 
 
3.217 
 
3.564 
.061 
 
.061 
 
.062 
2.957 
 
3.097 
 
3.442 
3.197 
 
3.337 
 
3.687 
RRQ-Rm Low 
 
Medium 
 
High 
3.402 
 
3.356 
 
3.194 
.059 
 
.059 
 
.060 
3.286 
 
3.239 
 
3.076 
3.518 
 
3.472 
 
3.313 
 
Note. N = 125; RRQ-Rf = Reflection subscale; RRQ-Rm = Rumination subscale. 
 
 The estimated marginal means (see Table 13) of the Need for Cognition subscale 
in relation to introspective reflection scores indicated that means for the high scoring 
group were larger than for the medium scoring group, which in turn had larger means 
than the low scoring group (high: 3.564, medium: 3.217, low: 3.077). The inverse was 
found among the need for cognition groups relative to introspective rumination scores 
(high: 3.194, medium: 3.356, low: 3.402), indicating that higher need for cognition scores  
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also correspond with lower rumination scores. Since categorical levels of intensity on the 
Need for Cognition subscale influenced self-reported introspective reflection, Hypothesis 
H5a was accepted. 
Summary 
 In this chapter, the study results were reported along with preliminary analyses of 
demographic data, descriptive statistics, and tests of relevant statistical assumptions. All 
hypotheses were accepted for research question one. For research question two, 
Hypothesis 2a was accepted while Hypothesis 2b was rejected. For research questions 
three, four and five, Hypotheses 3a, 4a, and 5a related to the Need for Cognition subscale 
were accepted while Hypotheses 3b, 4b, and 5b related to the Faith in Intuition subscale 
were rejected. Generally speaking, the results indicate that experiential cognition is 
inadequately represented by the Faith in Intuition subscale. All related hypotheses were 
thus rendered insignificant despite the apparent relationship of the other hypothesized 
experiential variables to one another as well as one of the latent canonical variates.  
 However, analytic cognition appears to be significantly related to nearly all of the 
orientation model variables while simultaneously representing a significant portion of the 
shared variance for one of the latent canonical variates. This unexpected result creates a 
series of important questions and potential interpretations of the current study that will be 
subsequently reviewed. An overview and interpretation of current study results is 
provided in the next chapter, along with a review of implications for clinical practice, 
limitations of the study, and directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION  
 This chapter provides a summary and discussion of the data analyses as well as 
the implications and limitations of this study. The first section summarizes the 
quantitative results of the study in light of the theoretical framework of the orientation 
model and the broader literature on dual process theories. The second section considers 
clinical and educational implications for the use of the orientation model in mental health 
settings, supervision practices, and academic research. The final sections explore the 
limitations of this study and considers future directions for research. 
Summary of the Study 
 The purpose of this study was to validate the structure of the proposed orientation 
model by exploring the relationships among its variables. Modeled within a dual process 
framework, it was hypothesized that the two subscales among each of four distinct 
composite instruments can be used to distinguish between analytic and experiential 
cognitive processing tendencies. The primary constructs include measures of rational and 
intuitive cognition styles, emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity attachment styles, 
cognitive and emotional empathy styles, and reflective and ruminative introspection 
styles. Accordingly, the orientation model proposes that dispositional tendencies towards 
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rational cognition, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective introspection are 
interrelated by means of analytic dual-processing, whereas such dispositional tendencies 
towards intuitive cognition, emotional reactivity, emotional empathy, and ruminative 
introspection are interrelated by means of experiential dual-processing (Wilkinson, 
2015).  
 While dispositional cognitive tendencies are a hallmark of the literature on dual-
processing, three of the four constructs and corresponding measures used in the 
orientation model were not developed with dual process theories in mind. These 
instruments included the Differentiation of Self Inventory–Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & 
Schmitt, 2003), the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1980), and the Reflection-
Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ; Trapnell & Campbell, 1999). The current study thus 
sought to investigate whether these dispositional measures of attachment, empathy and 
introspection might inadvertently gauge dual-processing tendencies. It was therefore 
surmised that the Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) - explicitly 
designed using a dual-processing framework - would effectively serve as a conceptual 
point of reference by which to ascertain the validity of the overarching hypothesis driving 
the orientation model.  
 The sample consisted of 375 undergraduate freshmen at a medium-sized, 
Midwestern research university. All participants were administered the researcher 
developed demographics questionnaire as well as the four composite instruments used 
with the orientation model. Bivariate correlations of the sub-measures within each of the 
four composite instruments replicated the well-established findings for each instrument 
and thus lend further support to the existing literature on each measure. Assumptions for 
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all subsequent analyses in the study were tested, including multivariate normality and the 
homogeneity of covariance matrices. The results of the subsequent canonical correlation 
analysis and factorial MANOVAs are discussed in detail below. 
Latent Variables Underlying the  
Orientation Model 
 
 A canonical correlation analysis (CCA) was conducted to determine whether the 
hypothesized relationships among the analytic and experiential variable sets were valid. 
Overall, two significant canonical functions were derived from the analysis wherein 
significant structure coefficients for each set of variables generally aligned with the 
hypothesized distinction between analytic and experiential dual-processing tendencies. 
Analytic cognition, emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective introspection 
were all significantly related to Function 1, albeit with the inclusion of emotional 
empathy. However, emotional empathy was also significantly related to Function 2 along 
with emotional reactivity and ruminative introspection, as well as the variable of 
emotional cutoff. The direction of these significant relationships lends support to the 
overarching hypothesis that the variables are generally distinguishable as analytic and 
experiential dual-processing sets that align with Function 1 and Function 2, respectively.  
 The degree to which cognitive and emotional empathy both influence the shared 
variance of analytic cognition while emotional cutoff and emotional reactivity both 
influence experiential cognition is a consequence of the positive correlations found 
among the subscales. However, it also poses a conceptual dilemma as to whether the 
canonical functions are actually indicative of analytic and experiential tendencies. An 
alternative interpretation might be that Function 1 represents positive self-regard related 
to adaptability and perceptiveness while Function 2 represents self-perceived emotional 
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vulnerability and sensitivity. This would also account for the significant cross loadings 
found among both the empathy and the attachment variables. Such an interpretation 
remains aligned with the thinking/feeling dichotomy as proposed by the orientation 
model (Wilkinson, 2015), albeit distinct from the hypotheses set forth in this particular 
study due to the positive and negative affective valences thus attributed to each set of 
variables. 
 The lack of significance of the experiential cognition variable does pose a distinct 
concern for the orientation model. Considered in the context of the alternative 
interpretation of the canonical functions as noted above, it seems likely that the Faith in 
Intuition subscale used to measure experiential cognitions is unrelated to either emotional 
vulnerability or sensitivity. Rather, it appears to more closely relate to constructs such as 
latent self-awareness and unconscious insight, which actually corresponds with an 
interpretation presented by Epstein (2014) regarding the psychoanalytic notions that 
influenced the scale’s original development. By framing analytic and experiential 
tendencies in terms of conscious and unconscious awareness rather than the distinction 
between controlled and automatic cognitions used by most modern dual-process theorists, 
the Faith in Intuition subscale appears to gauge a form of experiential processing distinct 
from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity, and therefore unrelated to the hypothesized 
experiential variables as implemented in the orientation model.  
 This interpretation sheds light on the insignificance of the Faith in Intuition 
subscale in relation to all subsequent analyses conducted for this study. In addressing 
research questions three, four, and five, the Faith in Intuition subscale proved to have no 
significant differences. The fact that the primary scale used to measure the construct of 
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experiential processing in this study did not significantly relate to any of the other 
hypothesized experiential variables only serves to further substantiate the notion that it 
may measure a distinct form of experiential processing related to unconscious insight. 
However, the benefit derived from this interpretation is that the orientation model would 
benefit from either the inclusion of an alternative assessment of intuitive cognition or the 
development of a scale that utilizes automatic cognitive processing rather than a form of 
unconscious insight as its foundational construct.  
Categorical Levels of Intensity  
for Analytic Cognition 
 
 Although the Faith in Intuition subscale provided no significant results across 
analyses in this study, the need for cognition scale contributed more significantly to the 
findings than was expected. The results of three separate factorial MANOVAs indicated 
that the analytic cognition variable measured using the Need for Cognition subscale is a 
significant predictor of not only emotional cutoff, cognitive empathy, and reflective 
introspection, but emotional empathy and ruminative introspection as well. Based on 
percentile scores, participants were grouped into low, medium, and high scoring 
conditions derived from their Need for Cognition subscale means, resulting in equal 
sample sizes for all categories (n = 125). These categorical levels of analytic cognition 
intensity were subsequently used to determine both the significance and direction of 
participant mean scores for the dependent variables in each analysis. Across all 
groupings, the categorical levels of analytic cognition intensity aligned with the direction 
of dependent variables scores as hypothesized within the orientation model (Wilkinson, 
2015).  
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 For attachment avoidance, an increase in categorical levels of analytic cognition 
intensity corresponded with a lowering of mean scores on the emotional cutoff subscale. 
This indicates that as the dispositional use of analytic cognition increases, the use of 
emotional cutoff as a maladaptive coping mechanism tends to decrease. Such a result 
aligns with the conceptual tenets of self-differentiation, which maintains that attachment 
avoidance strategies such as emotional cutoff are used less often when healthy 
interpersonal boundaries are more effectively implemented, cognitive flexibility is 
enhanced, and affective resilience increases (Bowen, 1978; Skowron & Friedlander, 
1998). Interestingly, analytic cognition similarly predicted the direction of mean scores 
for emotional reactivity despite the lack of overall statistical significance between the two 
variables. 
 For the measure of empathy, an increase in categorical levels of analytic cognition 
intensity corresponded with an increase of mean scores for both the cognitive and 
emotional empathy subscales. As further evidenced in the canonical correlation analysis, 
both empathy variables were significantly related to analytic cognition while the direction 
of the relationship was similarly associated. As such, increases in the dispositional use of 
analytic cognition correspond with increases in both cognitive and emotional empathy. 
The orientation model maintains that optimal mental health functioning should involve an 
increase in both forms of empathy as well as analytic cognition (Wilkinson, 2015). 
Furthermore, research has shown that the consistent use of both cognitive and emotional 
empathy leads to increases in positive coping (Davis, 1996) and healthy interpersonal 
functioning (Baron-Cohen, 1995).  
110 
 
 
 
 For the measure of introspection, an increase in categorical levels of analytic 
cognition intensity corresponded with an increase of mean scores for the reflective 
introspection subscale and a decrease of mean scores for the ruminative introspection 
subscale. In other words, an increase in the dispositional use of analytic cognition is 
associated with both an increase in reflective introspection and a decrease in ruminative 
introspection. According to the orientation model, optimal mental health functioning 
should result in just such a distinction (Wilkinson, 2015). Reflection is generally 
associated with positive psychological outcomes related to intellectual curiosity (Trapnell 
& Campbell, 1999) and cognitive adaptability (Marks, Sobanski, & Hine, 2010) The 
habitual use of ruminative introspection, on the other hand, is related to maladaptive 
psychological outcomes such as anxiety and depression (Watkins, 2008) as well as 
affective immersion in negative emotions (Kross, Ayduk, & Mischel, 2005). 
Interpretation of the Orientation  
Model Structure Based on  
Results of the Study 
 
 These three sets of results lend further support to the alternative hypothesis that 
was established above based on the CCA interpretation. Rather than view the proposed 
analytic and experiential variables sets according to the dual-processing distinction 
between automatic and controlled cognitive processing tendencies, there is room to 
consider whether these variable sets are actually indicative of self-perceived adaptability 
and vulnerability, respectively. As a descriptive tool for gauging mental health outcomes, 
this interpretation may provide a richer foundation than a strictly dual process-based 
account alone. The orientation model predicted the direction of subscale scores for both 
optimal and sub-optimal mental health outcomes (Wilkinson, 2015). Insofar as the 
111 
 
 
 
analytic cognition results for research questions three, four, and five in this study directly 
correspond with the predictions set forth in the orientation model, the present study lends 
additional credibility to the underlying premises that guide the model.  
 Researchers tend to weave positive mental health outcomes inextricably together 
with concepts such as resiliency and adaptiveness as protective psychological factors 
(Fredrickson, 2001; Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014). In kind, deficits in resiliency 
and adaptiveness are often discussed in relation to maladaptive coping strategies and 
emotional dysregulation (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2014), as well as being 
considered in the context of emotional vulnerabilities and related psychopathologies 
(Berking & Wupperman, 2012; Vaillant, 2000). If the orientation model indeed gauges 
the degree to which participants perceive themselves as either maintaining or lacking in 
psychological resiliency and adaptiveness, then its results provide a descriptive account 
of mental health and well-being rather than an explanatory account of dual-processing 
tendencies.  
 For the purposes of measuring progress in counseling and supervision, this has its 
obvious benefits. Providing counselors and supervisors with a tool to assess the severity 
of self-perceived emotional vulnerabilities in particular domains can enhance the 
specificity of case conceptualizations and interventions designed to promote growth in 
those areas. However, it runs counter to the prevailing idea among dual process theorists 
that analytic and experiential dual-processing tendencies are conceptually independent of 
value assessments (Evans, 2010). In other words, analytic and experiential cognitions 
should not be considered in terms of either positive or negative mental health outcomes. 
While a dispositional tendency towards the use of experiential cognitions may logically 
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correspond with the use of affective-oriented coping strategies, such strategies are not 
inherently flawed and their outcomes should not necessarily be deemed as maladaptive 
simply due to their affective bent (Epstein, 2014). 
 At the same time, the face validity of experiential measures used within the 
orientation model lean toward an emphasis on negative emotional consequences. Items 
such as “I’m overly sensitive to criticism” on the emotional reactivity subscale, or 
“Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself” on the ruminative 
introspection subscale clearly demonstrate maladaptive mental health outcomes. This 
disparity between the value independent premises of dual-processing and the positive-
negative valences attributable to some of the experiential measures within the orientation 
model raises a concern as to whether experiential processes can be quantified 
independently of negative emotional consequences. It has been argued by some theorists 
that experiential dual-processing tendencies are not measurable due to their being 
automatic and uncontrolled (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011). The spontaneous and 
reactive nature of such cognitions - looming outside of immediate awareness - may 
preclude their quantification.  
 As an alternative, it could be that relatively low scores across the analytic 
variables within the orientation model would provide a better indication of experiential 
processing tendencies than a separate set of experiential scales. This would be a case of a 
lack of analytic processing serving as an indicator for experiential processing as the only 
logical alternative. In other words, if one does not display a tendency to rely upon 
analytic cognitions under stressful conditions then their habitual tendency will likely be 
towards more automatic and experiential methods of coping. The predictive capacity of 
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the Need for Cognition subscale as evidenced in this study would suggest that it may 
provide a more reliable basis for discriminating between analytic and experiential dual-
processing tendencies. Pragmatically speaking, it would serve the same function as an 
experiential cognition subscale and reduce the total number of survey items in the 
orientation model. Yet it should be noted that there is no current research evidence to 
suggest that a deficit in analytic cognition necessarily reflects a surfeit in experiential 
cognition, or vice versa (Epstein, 2014; Epstein et al., 1996). 
Implications 
 The orientation model was primarily designed as an assessment tool to 
supplement case conceptualization practices in clinical practice. Merging several notable 
and empirically-validated instruments into a single measure of dual-processing 
tendencies, the model provides counselors with a means to assess important dispositional 
characteristics of clients early in the treatment process. This is particularly relevant for 
practitioners who are philosophically opposed to the use of quantitative measures, as is 
often the case among humanistic counselors. Dual processing capacities are clinically 
atheoretical insofar as any dispositional tendency to utilize analytic or experiential 
cognitions is unrelated to either positive or negative psychological outcomes. Such an 
equivocation inappropriately reduces the complexity of dual-process systems into an 
adaptive and maladaptive dichotomy.  
 However, the results of the current study might be interpreted as pointing to just 
such an equivocation. In light of these findings it is important to address two conceptual 
concerns related to such an interpretation of the orientation model. First, any proposed 
thinking/feeling dichotomy is an oversimplification of the dual-processing framework. 
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This point cannot be overstated and was clearly addressed by Wilkinson (2015) when 
developing the model. While there is indeed an emotional element associated with 
experiential tendencies, affect is not the de facto foundation for all such processing 
capacities. Experiential processing remains a form of cognition that conceptually 
subsumes affect as a distinct process therein. In so doing, affect is not reducible to mere 
reactivity or maladaptive responsiveness. Instead it encapsulates a range of behavioral 
control mechanisms including certain forms of emotional regulation and implicit learning 
(Gawronski, Sherman, & Trope, 2014; Stanovich et al., 2014).  
 The purpose of the thinking/feeling dichotomy is to simplify the conceptual 
framework such that a detailed knowledge of dual-process theories is not required to 
interpret results derived from the orientation model. A problem arises, however, when 
feeling is simply equated with a lack of inhibitory control or tendencies toward emotional 
dysregulation. Dual-process theories explicitly highlight the vital role of both analytic 
and experiential processing in emotional dysregulation. The capacity of analytic 
processes to override experiential processes involves decoupling, or the ability to sustain 
hypothetical reasoning and cognitive simulation operations despite the high resource 
demands required to sustain such operations (Evans, 2010; Stanovich et al., 2014). When 
these cognitive resources are lacking - as is often the case in unfamiliar or stressful 
situations – emotional dysregulation tends to follow. It would thus be more appropriate to 
suggest that a lack of sustained coordination between analytic and experiential processes 
can result in emotional dysregulation, rather than experiential processing being the de 
facto source of behavioral disinhibition. 
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 The second conceptual concern related to the results of this study is that habitual 
or dispositional tendencies towards the use of maladaptive coping strategies are not a 
direct indication of experiential cognitive processing. Rather, they are a consequence of 
the breakdown in cognitive decoupling that often occurs in unfamiliar or high stress 
situations. The results of this study support such an interpretation. The maladaptive 
coping strategies of emotional cutoff, emotional reactivity, and ruminative introspection 
are best understood in terms of their direct relationship to high stress environmental 
conditions and challenging personal or interpersonal circumstances. High scores across 
these variables thus provide a descriptive account of a client’s cognitive resource capacity 
under a given set of personal circumstances rather than serving as a globalized or 
otherwise general explanatory account of their cognitive processing capabilities.  
 Put another way, a tendency to rely on maladaptive coping strategies in daily life 
does not indicate a deficit in cognitive potential. Experiential cognitions are neither 
inherently problematic nor indicative of an underlying processing issue. High scores on 
the experiential variables in this study therefore serve to describe behavioral tendencies 
under stressful conditions rather than to explain presenting concerns as a consequence of 
biases towards experiential processing. This distinction is important so as to ensure that 
clients are not negatively conceptualized or described as “experiential processors.” As 
previously noted, dual process theories are clinically atheoretical and should not be used 
to explain why presenting concerns exist. Any such clinical explanations should be 
derived from the psychological constructs of attachment, empathy, or introspection rather 
than dual process theories. 
116 
 
 
 
 Beyond these concerns, the current study suggests that the orientation model can 
provide a unique foundation for conceptualizing client concerns in the therapeutic 
process. Until further studies are conducted, however, several conceptual adjustments 
must be made to any interpretation of clinical results. First, the results of this study 
suggest that analytic cognition, cognitive empathy, emotional empathy, and reflective 
introspection may align under the latent measure of positive self-regard related to 
adaptability or perceptiveness, whereas emotional cutoff, emotional reactivity, and 
ruminative introspection correspond with emotional vulnerability or sensitivity. Second, 
analytic cognition appears to be a separate indicator of latent self-awareness or 
unconscious insight, and statistically unrelated to the other variables. Third, until the 
measures in the orientation model have been standardized and appropriate cutoff scores 
applied based upon more generalizable research studies, any use of categorical levels of 
intensity (e.g., low, medium, or high scores) for interpreting client dispositional 
tendencies would be utterly arbitrary.  
 At the same time, each individual set of measures can still be effectively used to 
determine the dispositional tendencies of clients in those respective psychological 
domains without reference to the overarching tenets of the orientation model. Since the 
conceptual framework established by the orientation model does not require any 
allegiance to a dual processing framework for interpretation, the measures can be still 
used independently to conceptualize client presenting concerns. The same premise 
applies to supervisors or counselor educators interested in determining the growth 
trajectory of supervisees or counselor-in-training. Despite the need for continued research 
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to validate the conceptual framework of the orientation model, its empirically-validated 
measures provide a flexible and beneficial tool for clinical and supervisory practices.    
Limitations 
 There were several important limitations in this study. The participants represent a 
convenience sample that considerably limits the generalizability of study results beyond 
college students at a medium-sized, Midwestern research university. This limitation is 
further enhanced by the more particular selection of university participants, all of whom 
were first-time undergraduate freshmen in a selected freshman seminar course. In terms 
of self-knowledge and general developmental concerns, this population may be limited in 
terms of the insight and awareness needed to accurately identify their own dispositional 
tendencies. The accuracy with which they perceive their own tendencies might also be 
limited by their relative lack of life experience when compared to older and more 
experienced populations. Participants were also taken from a general student population 
that was not assessed in terms of a personal mental health history, which might have 
resulted in a greater tendency to self-score towards the mean. A similar concern stems 
from the potential role of social desirability bias, as having participants complete the 
assessment during a college class may have resulted in a misrepresentation of their actual 
self-perceptions. Finally, results from participants enrolled at a specific Midwestern 
university further limits the generalizability of the study. 
 A second limitation is related to the selection of instruments. In order to maximize 
the likelihood of participation, short-forms for each instrument were used to reduce the 
total number of items required to complete the survey. While this decision reduced the 
total number of items used in the survey nearly fourfold, it may have significantly 
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impacted the robustness of subsequent results. In turn, the internal reliability estimates for 
each of the measures were significantly lower than those produced by the long-forms. 
Whereas all of the subscales derived from the long-forms have been shown to result in 
Cronbach’s alpha scores ranging from good to excellent in the existing literature, the 
short-forms used in this study ranged only from questionable to good. The Faith in 
Intuition subscale – for which results across all analyses in this study were insignificant – 
had the lowest reliability score among the sub-measures (α = .672). While an analysis of 
study results seems to suggest that this lack of statistical significance was likely a result 
of construct validity issues, the possibility that its long-form version might have produced 
alternative results cannot be discounted. 
 A third limitation in this study was the absence of a baseline measure to gauge 
participant mental health. The lack of an evidence-based mental health assessment to 
determine the relationship between orientation model scores and general mental health 
concerns inhibits the generalizability of study results to clinical populations. The study 
provides no clear indication as to whether mental health status could influence the 
significance of findings among the orientation model variables.  However, this particular 
limitation does not necessarily apply in terms of using the study findings to extrapolate 
to, presumably, more normative populations such as clinical supervisees or counselors-in-
training.  
 The results might therefore be considered generalizable to active student 
populations rather than to the population at large, and thus of use in counselor training. 
However, readers should remain cautious about extrapolating these findings beyond a 
college freshman population in a selected area of the United States. As an initial step 
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towards developing a research protocol for investigating analytic and experiential dual-
processing tendencies based on the premises of the orientation model, the current study 
was designed to ascertain whether or not the hypothesized relationships among model 
variables would hold up to scrutiny. In this respect, future studies should extend upon the 
preliminary foundation established herein by conducting research with both different 
groups of participants and different combinations of model variables. 
Future Research 
 There are several directions in which future research could expand upon this study 
and refine its limitations. First, future studies should be conducted with alternative 
clinical and non-clinical populations. Since the orientation model is primarily designed as 
a clinical tool for the assessment of mental health outcomes and case conceptualization 
purposes, working with participants in mental health settings would be of substantial 
value. While this could certainly include the use of mental health assessment tools such 
as the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ; Goldberg, 1978), studies could also be 
designed to investigate the role of dual-processing tendencies among specific clinical 
populations or within the bounds of certain psychological diagnoses. It would be 
particularly interesting to combine the two, such as in comparing the role of dual-
processing tendencies among inpatient and outpatient populations for generalized anxiety 
disorders. A similar course of study would be beneficial related to populations with 
differing age ranges, socio-economic statuses, and educational backgrounds. 
 Secondly, future research might adjust the instruments used to analyze dual-
processing tendencies in the orientation model. For example, studies could include the 
full forms for each instrument rather than the short-forms used in the current study. While 
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this would substantially increase the time required for participants to complete the 
survey, the results would likely yield a more refined set of data. Internal consistency 
estimates for each of the long-forms reflect a substantially higher level of reliability 
which could, in turn, produce a richer data set for analysis. Either finding a new measure 
to replace the Faith in Intuition subscale or developing a new measure of experiential 
cognition altogether could be of value. However, the researcher would not necessarily 
deem the development of a new measure necessary unless further studies conclude that 
the long-form of the Faith in Intuition subscale is also statistically unrelated to the 
experiential variables in the orientation model. 
 A third direction could stem from a new set of research hypotheses regarding the 
role of low analytic cognition scores in determining experiential dual-processing 
tendencies. While this would require a new approach to interpreting the orientation 
model, it would align with the proposition set forth by some dual process theorists that 
experiential cognitions are not directly measurable (Evans, 2010; Stanovich, 2011). 
Instead, standardizing the scores among the analytic variable set and determining cutoff 
scores from research conducted across more generalizable populations could result in a 
streamlined version of the orientation model that still upholds its conceptual foundation. 
Furthermore, measures of varying mental health constructs that correlate with the Need 
for Cognition subscale could be incorporated into the orientation model itself and thereby 
expand its practical use for case conceptualization purposes. Such a process would 
require a considerable overhaul of the structure and design within the orientation model 
but might lead to a further enriching of the model as a result. 
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 A fourth direction for future studies could involve analyzing the model variables 
in different combinations or with the inclusion of new or additional subscales. For 
example, the Differentiation of Self Inventory-Revised (DSI-R; Skowron & Schmitt, 
2003) is actually composed of four subscales: Emotional Cutoff, Emotional Reactivity, 
Fusion with Others, and I-Position. Considering the negative valence of attachment 
scores as found in this study, it would be interesting to examine whether the positive 
language used for the I-Position items - such as “I tend to remain calm even under stress” 
- would correlate more heavily with analytic cognition scores than did emotional cutoff. 
Including a second set of measures related to introspective tendencies could also be of 
value, as the literature on self-consciousness discusses the value of distinguishing 
between particular four types of self-focused attention: reflection, rumination, insight, 
and internal state awareness (Grant, Franklin, & Langford, 2002). Finally, including the 
complete four factor scales for the REI, DSI-R, and IRI would likely provide 
considerably more robust results for analysis.  
Conclusion 
 This study was designed to validate the conceptual tenets of the orientation model 
as a strength-based conceptualization framework for humanistic counseling practices. 
Designed using dual-process theories as its theoretical basis and humanistic-existential 
tenets for its conceptual foundation, the model is intended to provide counselors with a 
flexible assessment tool that addresses important client attributes within a dispositional 
model of client cognitive processing patterns. Using empirically-validated measures 
related to the constructs of cognitive processing, attachment, empathy, and introspection, 
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the orientation model proposes that counselors can effectively supplement their clinical 
observations and judgments with atheoretical measures of client dispositional tendencies.  
 While the current study failed to provide a complete validation of the orientation 
model, the results did lend support to certain aspects of its conceptual structure. The Faith 
in Intuition subscale proved to be a poor measure of experiential cognition and its 
replacement with an alternative measure or newly designed measure may be necessary. 
Offsetting these results, the Need for Cognition subscale was a significant predictor of 
nearly all variables in the orientation model and its descriptive value led to a potential 
reorganization of the orientation model for future studies. The hypothesized relationship 
of each variable to optimal mental health functioning was validated, as was the 
relationship between analytic cognition and the use of healthy coping strategies.  
 Overall, results of the current study suggest that the orientation model provides a 
descriptive framework for distinguishing self-perceived adaptiveness or perceptiveness 
from emotional vulnerability or sensitivity. Rather than providing an explanatory 
foundation tied to dual process theories, any clinical use of the orientation model may 
benefit from avoiding theoretical generalizations related to dual processing altogether. 
Reliance solely upon the psychological constructs to inform clinical judgments or case 
conceptualization practices may thus be warranted at this time. This interpretation was 
examined in relation to the dual-processing literature, its practical implications for use in 
both clinical and supervisory settings was discussed, and directions for future research 
and theory generation were suggested. 
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CONSENT FORM FOR HUMAN PARTICIPATION IN RESEARCH 
 
UNIVERSITY OF NORTHERN COLORADO 
 
 
Project Title: The Orientation Model Survey 
Researcher:   Brett Wilkinson, M.A., Counselor Education & Supervision 
Research Advisor: Heather Helm, Ph.D., Counselor Education & Supervision 
Researcher Email: brett.wilkinson@unco.edu   Advisor Email: heather.helm@unco.edu 
 
 
You are invited to participate in a research project entitled “The Orientation Model 
Survey”, designed to assess individual patterns of information processing related to the 
areas of cognition, relationships, empathic awareness, and introspection. This study is 
being conducted by Brett Wilkinson, a doctoral student in the Counselor Education and 
Supervision Department at the University of Northern Colorado, under the supervision of 
Dr. Heather Helm. 
 
This study includes four questionnaires asking you to identify how you typically think, 
feel, and respond in a variety of situations.  It should take approximately 5 to 10 minutes 
to complete. Your replies will be confidential and you may stop participating at any time. 
There are no foreseeable risks associated with participation in this study, and you must be 18 
years or older to participate. While there are no immediate benefits of participation, you may 
gain some insight and self-awareness as a result of considering survey items. Participants will 
be entered into a drawing to win one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift cards. The winners will 
be selected using a random number generator, and contacted to collect the prize via email.  
 
Data collected and analyzed for this study will be kept on the UNC campus in a locked file 
cabinet and locked office. No one other than the researcher will have access to this material. 
We will assign a subject number to you. Only the primary researcher will know the name 
connected with a subject number and when data is reported, your name will not be used. 
Identifiable data will be destroyed three years following the end of data collection. 
 
Participation is voluntary. You may decide not to participate in this study and if you begin 
participation you may still decide to stop and withdraw at any time. Your decision will be 
respected and will not result in loss of benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. Having 
read the above and having had an opportunity to ask any questions, please click “Start” below 
if you would like to participate in this research and you are 18 years of age or older. A copy 
of this form will be given to you to retain for future reference. If you have any concerns 
about your selection or treatment as a research participant, please contact Sherry May, IRB 
Administrator, Office of Sponsored Programs, 25 Kepner Hall, University of Northern 
Colorado Greeley, CO 80639; 970-351-1910. 
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Rational Experiential Inventory (REI) 
 
(Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996) 
 
 
 1-----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4-----------------------5  
not very true of me          very true of me 
 
 
 
1. I don’t like to have to do a lot of thinking.  
2. I try to avoid situations that require thinking in depth about something.  
3. I prefer to challenge my thinking abilities rather than do things that require little    
   thought. 
4. I prefer complex problems to simple problems.  
5. Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
6. I trust my initial feelings about people. 
7. I believe in trusting my hunches. 
8. My initial impressions of people are almost always right. 
9. When it comes to trusting people, I can usually rely on my gut feelings. 
10. I can usually feel when a person is right or wrong, even if I can’t explain how I know. 
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DIFFERENTIATION OF SELF INVENTORY – SHORT FORM (DSI-SF) 
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Differentiation of Self Inventory - Short Form (DSI-SF) 
 
(Drake, Murdock, Marszalek, & Barber, 2015) 
 
 
          1------------------------2-------------------------3-----------------------4---------------------5  
not very true of me                                        very true of me 
 
 
1. I tend to distance myself when people get too close to me. 
2. At times my feelings get the best of me and I have trouble thinking clearly. 
3. I’m often uncomfortable when people get too close to me. 
4. At times, I feel as if I’m riding an emotional roller coaster. 
5. I’m overly sensitive to criticism. 
6. If I have had an argument with my spouse or partner, I tend to think about it all day. 
7. When one of my relationships becomes very intense, I feel the urge to run away. 
8. If someone is upset with me, I can’t seem to let it go easily. 
9. I’m very sensitive to being hurt by others. 
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INTERPERSONAL REACTIVITY INDEX (IRI) 
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Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) 
 
(Davis, 1980) 
 
          1----------------------2-----------------------3-----------------------4----------------------5  
doesn’t describe me well          describes me very well  
 
 
 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. 
2. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. 
3. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems. 
4. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. 
5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them. 
6. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from  
    their perspective. 
7. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal. 
8. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other  
   people’s arguments. 
9. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I often don’t feel very much pity for them. 
10. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
11. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
12. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
13. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
14. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place 
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REFLECTION AND RUMINATION QUESTIONNAIRE (RRQ) 
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Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire (RRQ) 
 
 (Trapnell & Campbell, 1999) 
 
 
 1--------------------2---------------------3--------------------4----------------------5  
strongly disagree        strongly agree 
 
 
1. My attention is often focused on aspects of myself I wish I'd stop thinking about 
2. Sometimes it is hard for me to shut off thoughts about myself 
3. I always seem to be rehashing in my mind things I’ve said or done 
4. I don't waste time re-thinking things that are over and done with (RS) 
5. I never ruminate or dwell on myself for very long (RS) 
6. I spend a great deal of time thinking back over embarrassing or disappointing moments 
7. I often reflect on episodes in my life that I should no longer concern myself with 
8. People often say I’m a “deep”, introspective person 
9. I’m very self-inquisitive by nature 
10. I'm not really a meditative type of person (RS) 
11. I love analyzing why I do things 
12. Contemplating myself isn’t my idea of fun (RS) 
13. I love to meditate on the nature and meaning of things 
14. I often love to look at my life in philosophical ways 
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RESEARCHER-DEVELOPED DEMOGRAPHICS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Researcher-Developed Demographics Questionnaire 
 
 
Please specify your age: 
o under 18 
o 18-19 
o 20-25 
o 26-35 
o 36-45 
o 46-55 
o 55 or over 
 
 
 
Please specify your gender. 
o Male 
o Female 
 
 
 
Please specify your race. 
o White 
o Black or African American 
o Hispanic or Latino 
o Asian or Pacific Islander 
o American Indian or Alaska Native 
o Other 
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RESEARCH OPPORTUNITY ANNOUNCEMENT 
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Formal Announcement of Research Opportunity to First-Year Seminar Students 
 
 
 
 
 
To All First-Year Seminar Students, 
 
You’re invited to participate in a brief research survey on information processing styles. It 
involves answering 49 questions and takes about 5-10 minutes. Your responses are 
confidential and you must be 18 years or older. Participation is completely voluntary.  
 
Participants can choose to enter a prize drawing for one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift 
cards for completing the entire survey. If you are interested and over the age of 18, please 
click the link below: 
 
[SPACE TO INSERT QUALTRICS LINK] 
 
Thank you, 
 
Brett D Wilkinson 
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Follow-up Announcement of Research Opportunity to First-Year Seminar Students 
 
 
 
 
 
To All First-Year Seminar Students, 
 
This is a follow-up email to remind students about the following survey opportunity: 
 
You’re invited to participate in a brief research survey on information processing styles. It 
involves answering 50 questions and takes about 5-10 minutes. Your responses are 
confidential and you must be 18 years or older. Participation is completely voluntary.  
 
Participants can choose to enter a prize drawing for one of two $50.00 Amazon.com gift 
cards for completing the entire survey. If you are interested and over the age of 18, please 
click the link below: 
 
[SPACE TO INSERT QUALTRICS LINK] 
 
Thank you, 
 
Brett D Wilkinson 
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I n s t i t u t i o n a l  R e v i e w  B o a r d 
 
 
DATE: November 3, 2015 
 
TO: Brett Wilkinson, MA  
FROM: University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB 
 
PROJECT TITLE: [417697-2] The Orientation Survey  
SUBMISSION TYPE:     Amendment/Modification 
 
ACTION: APPROVAL/VERIFICATION OF EXEMPT STATUS  
DECISION DATE: November 2, 2015 
 
 
Thank you for your submission of Amendment/Modification materials for this project. The 
University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB approves this project and verifies its status as 
EXEMPT according to federal IRB regulations. 
 
Thanks for a clear resubmit. I wanted to note for IRBs record you said 100$ at one 
place in the narrative, but I know you meant 50 and should correct. 
 
Best Wishes, 
 
Maria 
 
We will retain a copy of this correspondence within our records for a duration of 4 years. 
 
If you have any questions, please contact Sherry May at 970-351-1910 or 
Sherry.May@unco.edu. Please include your project title and reference number in all 
correspondence with this committee. 
 
 
 
 
This letter has been electronically signed in accordance with all applicable regulations, and a copy is retained within 
University of Northern Colorado (UNCO) IRB's records. 
